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I found the following article by Haider Ala Hamoudi quite interesting that presents a wonderful overview of womens views in the Muslim world, particularly Iraq, and the usual western “either or” assumptive methodology of categorizing nations and peoples.

I think neocons have been fairly broadly and justifiably criticized by the left for making the silly assumption that once Iraqis were freed from the tyrant Saddam Hussein, they would just naturally gravitate toward some form of liberal democracy, because that is just what people naturally like. Somehow, because we like it, we figure it must be second nature, in the blood, something you just adopt because it’s the right thing to do and you feel right when you do it. Like a bowel movement or something.

But what I don’t think anyone on the left has come to realize is how often they play with precisely the same assumptions, and often fail just as badly as a result, though of course with less deleterious effect. The one that comes to my mind most prominently is the issue of women’s rights. This is a debate I have long internalized when it comes to Iraq, with an Iraqi mother and an Iraqi wife and Iraqi aunts and cousins. It’s a debate in which I have engaged in on a number of fronts—political, legal and social. For me, it’s personal though not one tenth as personal as Iraqi women I concede from the start.

And I am shocked, truly shocked and amazed, by the number of people, organizations and institutions who seem to think that the way to achieve women’s rights in some progressive fashion in Iraq is through creating a gender quota in the Parliament because then women will vote for things that are good for women. (I don’t oppose gender quotas, but I do think of them as silly if the goal is to ensure women vote progressively for women’s rights) It is assumed that once you have women in Parliament, then they vote the “right” way on women’s issues and all is solved. Then when that falls flat on its face as anyone who knows anything about Iraq could have predicted from the start, we scratch our collective heads, try to figure out who is forcing these women to vote against their interests, and then try to remove that element of coercion. Maybe their brothers? Their parents? The parties, which could remove them from positions because the elections work by party list and not by geographic distribution? Somebody is out there stopping this, let’s figure out who, the group out there holding back the natural order of liberal notions of women’s rights as Saddam held back the natural order of liberal democracy. Eliminate that, and all else falls into place. Wolfowitz without the guns.

Never mind that Islamist parties put Islamist women on their lists, and reliable and outspoken ones. Never mind that the political Islam movement in Iraq has about as many women supporters as men (women voted too, in high numbers, and the Islamists won overwhelmingly), never mind that many of the initiatives that go precisely against any modern conception of women’s rights come from women, and in some cases receive only casual support within the Islamist camps. (That’s because Islamist men are not quite as obsessed with stopping the progression of women’s issues as Islamist women, and that is saying something.) Somehow, deep down, these women can’t possibly believe these positions, we think, they can’t actually think Islamism is good for them, and so they are being coerced. It is as if it doesn’t matter where the women in question grew up, doesn’t matter what educational system they entered, doesn’t matter what the values of their family were, none of this matters or at most is a troublesome set of impediments you just jump over. Somehow, despite all that they just yearn to be free. You just have to get rid of the coercion and it will all naturally fall into place, whether the daughter of a Najaf cleric or the adopted professional gay couple in Vermont, we all just want freedom. And of course to prove the point you do have some number of women you can point to in the parliament, a small number, but genuinely Iraqi and claiming greater strength in the hearts of the people (what political group doesn’t) so this somehow proves the case. Just as Bush had Ahmed Chalabi, which proved his case that Iraqis just want freedom, whatever he meant by that.

These initiatives have gone about as well as the initial invasion of Iraq. Mostly they feel offensive and imperialist because they certainly come off that way—we’re going to tell you what is in your interests, because it is in the interests of every right thinking woman. The supposed broad secret middle of Islamist women nominated by Islamist parties who are going to vote with secular women to remove shari’a from family law, that is, to reject Islamism entirely (in this game, if you turn on family law, you’ve turned on everything) has yet to appear. But we keep trying. Imagine pro choicers deciding that the centerpiece of their agenda is convincing Sarah Palin that women should have a right to abortion, because every right thinking woman must think that. Imagine how great that would turn out for the movement. That’s actually the centerpiece of the plan in Iraq, and has been all along. Really, it has.

When things went so terribly wrong in Iraq in 2006, we stopped, looked around and came to realize, this is a different place, these are different people, with different ideas and different sets of institutions and different relationships to the government. This did NOT mean we reinstituted Saddam, but it did mean we took a step back, assessed the situation, the institutions, the interests and above all the people of Iraq, and reformulated strategy in a manner that would work, for us and but more certainly for Iraq.

How to improve women’s rights in Iraq, to the extent one considers this a good idea?  As someone close to Iraq, and in many ways of Iraq, I don’t suffer from the ambivalence others might have about influencing societies they know little about and have little to do with.  Given that background, I have thought about the issue of women’s rights, and I have a few ideas, which include:

-A focus on strategies like closing the gender literacy gap that do not create opposition in Islamist camps.

-A women’s caucus of women parliamentary members so that the issues of importance to women receive a frequent and public airing and remain in public view even if the issues won’t lead to an agreement on the issues in question.

-Challenging before Iraqi courts regulations that discriminate against women, most prominently the ones that are not based on shari’a at all. (I have a list.)

These are just a few, I’m sure there are others, many better. The first step, however, is to stop imagining that deep in the ovaries of every human being with a double X chromosome is a NOW feminist waiting to emerge.

Source: http://muslimlawprof.org/2009/07/10/women-in-the-new-iraq.aspx

The Real Struggle in Iran and Implications for U.S. Dialogue

June 29, 2009


Graphic for Geopolitical Intelligence Report

By George Friedman

Speaking of the situation in Iran, U.S. President Barack Obama said June 26, “We don’t yet know how any potential dialogue will have been affected until we see what has happened inside of Iran.” On the surface that is a strange statement, since we know that with minor exceptions, the demonstrations in Tehran lost steam after Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for them to end and security forces asserted themselves. By the conventional wisdom, events in Iran represent an oppressive regime crushing a popular rising. If so, it is odd that the U.S. president would raise the question of what has happened in Iran.

In reality, Obama’s point is well taken. This is because the real struggle in Iran has not yet been settled, nor was it ever about the liberalization of the regime. Rather, it has been about the role of the clergy — particularly the old-guard clergy — in Iranian life, and the future of particular personalities among this clergy.

Ahmadinejad Against the Clerical Elite

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ran his re-election campaign against the old clerical elite, charging them with corruption, luxurious living and running the state for their own benefit rather than that of the people. He particularly targeted Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, an extremely senior leader, and his family. Indeed, during the demonstrations, Rafsanjani’s daughter and four other relatives were arrested, held and then released a day later.

Rafsanjani represents the class of clergy that came to power in 1979. He served as president from 1989-1997, but Ahmadinejad defeated him in 2005. Rafsanjani carries enormous clout within the system as head of the regime’s two most powerful institutions — the Expediency Council, which arbitrates between the Guardian Council and parliament, and the Assembly of Experts, whose powers include oversight of the supreme leader. Forbes has called him one of the wealthiest men in the world. Rafsanjani, in other words, remains at the heart of the post-1979 Iranian establishment.

Ahmadinejad expressly ran his recent presidential campaign against Rafsanjani, using the latter’s family’s vast wealth to discredit Rafsanjani along with many of the senior clerics who dominate the Iranian political scene. It was not the regime as such that he opposed, but the individuals who currently dominate it. Ahmadinejad wants to retain the regime, but he wants to repopulate the leadership councils with clerics who share his populist values and want to revive the ascetic foundations of the regime. The Iranian president constantly contrasts his own modest lifestyle with the opulence of the current religious leadership.

Recognizing the threat Ahmadinejad represented to him personally and to the clerical class he belongs to, Rafsanjani fired back at Ahmadinejad, accusing him of having wrecked the economy. At his side were other powerful members of the regime, including Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani, who has made no secret of his antipathy toward Ahmadinejad and whose family links to the Shiite holy city of Qom give him substantial leverage. The underlying issue was about the kind of people who ought to be leading the clerical establishment. The battlefield was economic: Ahmadinejad’s charges of financial corruption versus charges of economic mismanagement leveled by Rafsanjani and others.

When Ahmadinejad defeated Mir Hossein Mousavi on the night of the election, the clerical elite saw themselves in serious danger. The margin of victory Ahmadinejad claimed might have given him the political clout to challenge their position. Mousavi immediately claimed fraud, and Rafsanjani backed him up. Whatever the motives of those in the streets, the real action was a knife fight between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani. By the end of the week, Khamenei decided to end the situation. In essence, he tried to hold things together by ordering the demonstrations to halt while throwing a bone to Rafsanjani and Mousavi by extending a probe into the election irregularities and postponing a partial recount by five days.

The Struggle Within the Regime

The key to understanding the situation in Iran is realizing that the past weeks have seen not an uprising against the regime, but a struggle within the regime. Ahmadinejad is not part of the establishment, but rather has been struggling against it, accusing it of having betrayed the principles of the Islamic Revolution. The post-election unrest in Iran therefore was not a matter of a repressive regime suppressing liberals (as in Prague in 1989), but a struggle between two Islamist factions that are each committed to the regime, but opposed to each other.

The demonstrators certainly included Western-style liberalizing elements, but they also included adherents of senior clerics who wanted to block Ahmadinejad’s re-election. And while Ahmadinejad undoubtedly committed electoral fraud to bulk up his numbers, his ability to commit unlimited fraud was blocked, because very powerful people looking for a chance to bring him down were arrayed against him.

The situation is even more complex because it is not simply a fight between Ahmadinejad and the clerics, but also a fight among the clerical elite regarding perks and privileges — and Ahmadinejad is himself being used within this infighting. The Iranian president’s populism suits the interests of clerics who oppose Rafsanjani; Ahmadinejad is their battering ram. But as Ahmadinejad increases his power, he could turn on his patrons very quickly. In short, the political situation in Iran is extremely volatile, just not for the reason that the media portrayed.

Rafsanjani is an extraordinarily powerful figure in the establishment who clearly sees Ahmadinejad and his faction as a mortal threat. Ahmadinejad’s ability to survive the unified opposition of the clergy, election or not, is not at all certain. But the problem is that there is no unified clergy. The supreme leader is clearly trying to find a new political balance while making it clear that public unrest will not be tolerated. Removing “public unrest” (i.e., demonstrations) from the tool kits of both sides may take away one of Rafsanjani’s more effective tools. But ultimately, it actually could benefit him. Should the internal politics move against the Iranian president, it would be Ahmadinejad — who has a substantial public following — who would not be able to have his supporters take to the streets.

The View From the West

The question for the rest of the world is simple: Does it matter who wins this fight? We would argue that the policy differences between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani are minimal and probably would not affect Iran’s foreign relations. This fight simply isn’t about foreign policy.

Rafsanjani has frequently been held up in the West as a pragmatist who opposes Ahmadinejad’s radicalism. Rafsanjani certainly opposes Ahmadinejad and is happy to portray the Iranian president as harmful to Iran, but it is hard to imagine significant shifts in foreign policy if Rafsanjani’s faction came out on top. Khamenei has approved Iran’s foreign policy under Ahmadinejad, and Khamenei works to maintain broad consensus on policies. Ahmadinejad’s policies were vetted by Khamenei and the system that Rafsanjani is part of. It is possible that Rafsanjani secretly harbors different views, but if he does, anyone predicting what these might be is guessing.

Rafsanjani is a pragmatist in the sense that he systematically has accumulated power and wealth. He seems concerned about the Iranian economy, which is reasonable because he owns a lot of it. Ahmadinejad’s entire charge against him is that Rafsanjani is only interested in his own economic well-being. These political charges notwithstanding, Rafsanjani was part of the 1979 revolution, as were Ahmadinejad and the rest of the political and clerical elite. It would be a massive mistake to think that any leadership elements have abandoned those principles.

When the West looks at Iran, two concerns are expressed. The first relates to the Iranian nuclear program, and the second relates to Iran’s support for terrorists, particularly Hezbollah. Neither Iranian faction is liable to abandon either, because both make geopolitical sense for Iran and give it regional leverage.

Tehran’s primary concern is regime survival, and this has two elements. The first is deterring an attack on Iran, while the second is extending Iran’s reach so that such an attack could be countered. There are U.S. troops on both sides of the Islamic Republic, and the United States has expressed hostility to the regime. The Iranians are envisioning a worst-case scenario, assuming the worst possible U.S. intentions, and this will remain true no matter who runs the government.

We do not believe that Iran is close to obtaining a nuclear weapon, a point we have made frequently. Iran understands that the actual acquisition of a nuclear weapon would lead to immediate U.S. or Israeli attacks. Accordingly, Iran’s ideal position is to be seen as developing nuclear weapons, but not close to having them. This gives Tehran a platform for bargaining without triggering Iran’s destruction, a task at which it has proved sure-footed.

In addition, Iran has maintained capabilities in Iraq and Lebanon. Should the United States or Israel attack, Iran would thus be able to counter by doing everything possible destabilize Iraq — bogging down U.S. forces there — while simultaneously using Hezbollah’s global reach to carry out terror attacks. After all, Hezbollah is today’s al Qaeda on steroids. The radical Shiite group’s ability, coupled with that of Iranian intelligence, is substantial.

We see no likelihood that any Iranian government would abandon this two-pronged strategy without substantial guarantees and concessions from the West. Those would have to include guarantees of noninterference in Iranian affairs. Obama, of course, has been aware of this bedrock condition, which is why he went out of his way before the election to assure Khamenei in a letter that the United States had no intention of interfering.

Though Iran did not hesitate to lash out at CNN’s coverage of the protests, the Iranians know that the U.S. government doesn’t control CNN’s coverage. But Tehran takes a slightly different view of the BBC. The Iranians saw the depiction of the demonstrations as a democratic uprising against a repressive regime as a deliberate attempt by British state-run media to inflame the situation. This allowed the Iranians to vigorously blame some foreigner for the unrest without making the United States the primary villain.

But these minor atmospherics aside, we would make three points. First, there was no democratic uprising of any significance in Iran. Second, there is a major political crisis within the Iranian political elite, the outcome of which probably tilts toward Ahmadinejad but remains uncertain. Third, there will be no change in the substance of Iran’s foreign policy, regardless of the outcome of this fight. The fantasy of a democratic revolution overthrowing the Islamic Republic — and thus solving everyone’s foreign policy problems a la the 1991 Soviet collapse — has passed.

That means that Obama, as the primary player in Iranian foreign affairs, must now define an Iran policy — particularly given Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s meeting in Washington with U.S. Middle East envoy George Mitchell this Monday. Obama has said that nothing that has happened in Iran makes dialogue impossible, but opening dialogue is easier said than done. The Republicans consistently have opposed an opening to Iran; now they are joined by Democrats, who oppose dialogue with nations they regard as human rights violators. Obama still has room for maneuver, but it is not clear where he thinks he is maneuvering. The Iranians have consistently rejected dialogue if it involves any preconditions. But given the events of the past weeks, and the perceptions about them that have now been locked into the public mind, Obama isn’t going to be able to make many concessions.

It would appear to us that in this, as in many other things, Obama will be following the Bush strategy — namely, criticizing Iran without actually doing anything about it. And so he goes to Moscow more aware than ever that Russia could cause the United States a great deal of pain if it proceeded with weapons transfers to Iran, a country locked in a political crisis and unlikely to emerge from it in a pleasant state of mind.

source: www.stratfor.com

Our Comments

Surely this news is somewhat intriguing considering the usual rhetoric espoused by neo-cons like Sean Hannity and his ilk who somehow espouse an awkward political or ideological theory that “Most Iranians are backlashing against the regime due to their desire for liberal democracy among the “educated”. Of course, anyone with a shred of political common sense knows this is nothing short of neo-con delusion. Many of these extremist media pundits would like to interpret the Iranian political unrest as a reflection of civilian unrest against Iranian foreign policy towards the United States and that the “populace” wishes to incorporate American values into the regime, which is complete hogwash considering that the entire state of Iran virtually revolted against the American backed Shah regime in 1979 due to the import of American lifestyle to the country.

Western Misconceptions Meet Iranian Reality

June 15, 2009
Graphic for Geopolitical Intelligence Report

By George Friedman

In 1979, when we were still young and starry-eyed, a revolution took place in Iran. When I asked experts what would happen, they divided into two camps.

The first group of Iran experts argued that the Shah of Iran would certainly survive, that the unrest was simply a cyclical event readily manageable by his security, and that the Iranian people were united behind the Iranian monarch’s modernization program. These experts developed this view by talking to the same Iranian officials and businessmen they had been talking to for years — Iranians who had grown wealthy and powerful under the shah and who spoke English, since Iran experts frequently didn’t speak Farsi all that well.

The second group of Iran experts regarded the shah as a repressive brute, and saw the revolution as aimed at liberalizing the country. Their sources were the professionals and academics who supported the uprising — Iranians who knew what former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini believed, but didn’t think he had much popular support. They thought the revolution would result in an increase in human rights and liberty. The experts in this group spoke even less Farsi than the those in the first group.

Misreading Sentiment in Iran

Limited to information on Iran from English-speaking opponents of the regime, both groups of Iran experts got a very misleading vision of where the revolution was heading — because the Iranian revolution was not brought about by the people who spoke English. It was made by merchants in city bazaars, by rural peasants, by the clergy — people Americans didn’t speak to because they couldn’t. This demographic was unsure of the virtues of modernization and not at all clear on the virtues of liberalism. From the time they were born, its members knew the virtue of Islam, and that the Iranian state must be an Islamic state.

Americans and Europeans have been misreading Iran for 30 years. Even after the shah fell, the myth has survived that a mass movement of people exists demanding liberalization — a movement that if encouraged by the West eventually would form a majority and rule the country. We call this outlook “iPod liberalism,” the idea that anyone who listens to rock ‘n’ roll on an iPod, writes blogs and knows what it means to Twitter must be an enthusiastic supporter of Western liberalism. Even more significantly, this outlook fails to recognize that iPod owners represent a small minority in Iran — a country that is poor, pious and content on the whole with the revolution forged 30 years ago.

There are undoubtedly people who want to liberalize the Iranian regime. They are to be found among the professional classes in Tehran, as well as among students. Many speak English, making them accessible to the touring journalists, diplomats and intelligence people who pass through. They are the ones who can speak to Westerners, and they are the ones willing to speak to Westerners. And these people give Westerners a wildly distorted view of Iran. They can create the impression that a fantastic liberalization is at hand — but not when you realize that iPod-owning Anglophones are not exactly the majority in Iran.

Last Friday, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re-elected with about two-thirds of the vote. Supporters of his opponent, both inside and outside Iran, were stunned. A poll revealed that former Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi was beating Ahmadinejad. It is, of course, interesting to meditate on how you could conduct a poll in a country where phones are not universal, and making a call once you have found a phone can be a trial. A poll therefore would probably reach people who had phones and lived in Tehran and other urban areas. Among those, Mousavi probably did win. But outside Tehran, and beyond persons easy to poll, the numbers turned out quite different.

Some still charge that Ahmadinejad cheated. That is certainly a possibility, but it is difficult to see how he could have stolen the election by such a large margin. Doing so would have required the involvement of an incredible number of people, and would have risked creating numbers that quite plainly did not jibe with sentiment in each precinct. Widespread fraud would mean that Ahmadinejad manufactured numbers in Tehran without any regard for the vote. But he has many powerful enemies who would quickly have spotted this and would have called him on it. Mousavi still insists he was robbed, and we must remain open to the possibility that he was, although it is hard to see the mechanics of this.

Ahmadinejad’s Popularity

It also misses a crucial point: Ahmadinejad enjoys widespread popularity. He doesn’t speak to the issues that matter to the urban professionals, namely, the economy and liberalization. But Ahmadinejad speaks to three fundamental issues that accord with the rest of the country.

First, Ahmadinejad speaks of piety. Among vast swathes of Iranian society, the willingness to speak unaffectedly about religion is crucial. Though it may be difficult for Americans and Europeans to believe, there are people in the world to whom economic progress is not of the essence; people who want to maintain their communities as they are and live the way their grandparents lived. These are people who see modernization — whether from the shah or Mousavi — as unattractive. They forgive Ahmadinejad his economic failures.

Second, Ahmadinejad speaks of corruption. There is a sense in the countryside that the ayatollahs — who enjoy enormous wealth and power, and often have lifestyles that reflect this — have corrupted the Islamic Revolution. Ahmadinejad is disliked by many of the religious elite precisely because he has systematically raised the corruption issue, which resonates in the countryside.

Third, Ahmadinejad is a spokesman for Iranian national security, a tremendously popular stance. It must always be remembered that Iran fought a war with Iraq in the 1980s that lasted eight years, cost untold lives and suffering, and effectively ended in its defeat. Iranians, particularly the poor, experienced this war on an intimate level. They fought in the war, and lost husbands and sons in it. As in other countries, memories of a lost war don’t necessarily delegitimize the regime. Rather, they can generate hopes for a resurgent Iran, thus validating the sacrifices made in that war — something Ahmadinejad taps into. By arguing that Iran should not back down but become a major power, he speaks to the veterans and their families, who want something positive to emerge from all their sacrifices in the war.

Perhaps the greatest factor in Ahmadinejad’s favor is that Mousavi spoke for the better districts of Tehran — something akin to running a U.S. presidential election as a spokesman for Georgetown and the Lower East Side. Such a base will get you hammered, and Mousavi got hammered. Fraud or not, Ahmadinejad won and he won significantly. That he won is not the mystery; the mystery is why others thought he wouldn’t win.

For a time on Friday, it seemed that Mousavi might be able to call for an uprising in Tehran. But the moment passed when Ahmadinejad’s security forces on motorcycles intervened. And that leaves the West with its worst-case scenario: a democratically elected anti-liberal.

Western democracies assume that publics will elect liberals who will protect their rights. In reality, it’s a more complicated world. Hitler is the classic example of someone who came to power constitutionally, and then preceded to gut the constitution. Similarly, Ahmadinejad’s victory is a triumph of both democracy and repression.

The Road Ahead: More of the Same

The question now is what will happen next. Internally, we can expect Ahmadinejad to consolidate his position under the cover of anti-corruption. He wants to clean up the ayatollahs, many of whom are his enemies. He will need the support of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This election has made Ahmadinejad a powerful president, perhaps the most powerful in Iran since the revolution. Ahmadinejad does not want to challenge Khamenei, and we suspect that Khamenei will not want to challenge Ahmadinejad. A forced marriage is emerging, one which may place many other religious leaders in a difficult position.

Certainly, hopes that a new political leadership would cut back on Iran’s nuclear program have been dashed. The champion of that program has won, in part because he championed the program. We still see Iran as far from developing a deliverable nuclear weapon, but certainly the Obama administration’s hopes that Ahmadinejad would either be replaced — or at least weakened and forced to be more conciliatory — have been crushed. Interestingly, Ahmadinejad sent congratulations to U.S. President Barack Obama on his inauguration. We would expect Obama to reciprocate under his opening policy, which U.S. Vice President Joe Biden appears to have affirmed, assuming he was speaking for Obama. Once the vote fraud issue settles, we will have a better idea of whether Obama’s policies will continue. (We expect they will.)

What we have now are two presidents in a politically secure position, something that normally forms a basis for negotiations. The problem is that it is not clear what the Iranians are prepared to negotiate on, nor is it clear what the Americans are prepared to give the Iranians to induce them to negotiate. Iran wants greater influence in Iraq and its role as a regional leader acknowledged, something the United States doesn’t want to give them. The United States wants an end to the Iranian nuclear program, which Iran doesn’t want to give.

On the surface, this would seem to open the door for an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Former U.S. President George W. Bush did not — and Obama does not — have any appetite for such an attack. Both presidents blocked the Israelis from attacking, assuming the Israelis ever actually wanted to attack.

For the moment, the election appears to have frozen the status quo in place. Neither the United States nor Iran seem prepared to move significantly, and there are no third parties that want to get involved in the issue beyond the occasional European diplomatic mission or Russian threat to sell something to Iran. In the end, this shows what we have long known: This game is locked in place, and goes on.

www.stratfor.com

An interesting news report regarding the newly formulated scientific term “thought identification” which is a clausal phrase which implicitly hides its true reality, which is none other than “mind reading”.

I know non Muslims like I know my own hand. There will be much of a breach into the arena of oppression rather than the door of justice, and the devils reality is that it will market this oppression in the name of justice, just as they have done with the “war on terror”, only on a much more massive scale involving the whole populace of entire societies wallahul-alim.

My personal opinion, it may be able to reveal experience, but with intention, there is a major flaw to it. In fact, I predict (if Allah wills for this to go forward) that this entire field will affect many sectors of human legislation resulting in hundreds and maybe thousands of government policies worldwide, and the greatest and most controversial arena in this whole field would most likely be the “intention” factor, more so than the experiential factor or the interpretation of thoughts.

A few Intellectual Criticisms to Note

1. The final deduction he made, about the idea being eerie because it tells us human nature is nothing but chemical reactions, is completely biased.  Just because our thoughts can be recognised in brain-patterns, doesn’t mean that our thoughts in essence are nothing more than brain-patterns. They still haven’t found the exact causality, they only know that activity in regions is correlated with certain thoughts. It could be the activity causing the idea, or the idea causing the activity, or both being caused by something else.

2. There is another aspect of philosophical science that delves into the aspects of language shaping our very thought and logic. A much more informative analysis can be accessed here “Language Shaping our Thought” to see what we are  referring to. So how does this necessarily correlate with the above related pseudo science. As the study shows regarding language, the very thought patterns of various human ethnic backgrounds can dramatically affect the very thought pattern of specified individuals. That would by default entail that due to regional languages of the world, it would complicate the issue of mind reading astronomically and would present a challenge to the matter of mind reading. Just having a read into the scientific deductions of language shaping our thoughts would clearly demonstrate to the reader the complexity of the matter signifying that mind reading in practice cannot be universal unless machines were going to take into account all of these subtle difference in thought patterns of various ethnic groups of the world.

3. the Moral Debate- the debate regarding the intricacies of this pioneered science would be astronomical universally throughout world governments, that is, those who merely entertain the idea. From criminal law to business and economics, and even to international espionage, this thing will spark a whole new realm of morality, structure and even civilizational existence.

The thing that stems from the moral debate is simply the utter and total misuse of it. For example, in one extraction of the news, it revealed that it can access imagery of what a person has seen. Adding to that, in another part, the other scientist said it can detect where a person has been, like an al-qa’ida camp. Okay great. However, what that translates to in covert espionage language is that they can grab a Muslim who may have seen a glimpse of an al-qa’eda camp on some obscure website, and then charge them for actually being an al-qa’eda member.

Another example, is the issue of love and hate, and other sentiments which one of the scientist was discussing. to what extent will the right to hold information have. How will this affect marriages. This mere scientific accomplishment is a snowball effect of virtually millions of legal, political, and international affairs that could result from this

4. Intention- I would be a strong critic and denier in the ability to actual interpret intentions. This issue itself will be the very core of the entire moral debate, the right of our individuality to individuality. The articulation of our intention other than our own will completely strips individuality. However, we believe in Islam that no man can “know” the intentions of another. We have full conviction in this. They will never be able to correctly identify intentions in their proper context and they may only be able to present some considerable evidences, but nothing more.

We are not arguing the fact that there can be some benefit derived of this technology, but the question I would simply ask is “at what cost”?



انصر أخواتك في فرنسا

هناك قانون لطرد المنتقبات وعدم السماح لهن بالوجود بفرنسا

خذ دقيقة للتعبير عن رأيك

http://www.petitiononline.com/R2011R/petition.html
________________________________________________________________________________

Where is this claimed freedom you are talking about?


الرئيس ساركوزي
أين الحرية يا رئيس بلاد الحرية

You said in your speech: “The problem of the burka (face covering) is not a religious problem; it’s a problem of liberty and women’s dignity. It’s not a religious symbol, but a sign of subservience and debasement.

لقد قلت في خطبتكم ان «البرقع غير مرحب به في فرنسا» وان هذا النقاب «ليس موضع ترحيب في اراضي الجمهورية»، معتبر انه «ليس رمزا دينيا (بل) رمز استعباد» للمرأة

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I want to say solemnly, the burka is not welcome in France. In our country, we can’t accept women prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity. That’s not our idea of freedom.”

We want you to know that all French women wearing (face covering) do this out of their own will and not under oppression as you might think, or as the media claims.

نريد أن نخبرك أن كل الأخوات الموجودات في فرنسا هنا يلبسن النقاب عن قناعة كاملة وبطواعية واختيار وليس بضغوطات عائلية أو من قبل الزوج كما تروج بعض وسائل الإعلام الفرنسية

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And if there are some women who do this action oppressed, we do deny this action because it is against the freedom of will in Islam.
“وإذا كانت هناك أخوات يتنقبن تحت ضغوط خارجية فإننا كمسلمات ندينه ونعتبره لا ينطبق مع مبدأ حرية الاختيار الذي يقره ديننا العظيم”.

——————————————————-
President Sarkosy…

It is our right to wear whatever we like. It is our right to apply our religious teachings in our country…We are French Muslim women and have rights that must be respected by you as a president and by all people.

من حقنا أن نلبس ما نشاء
من حقنا أن نمارس شعائر ديننا بحرية في بلادنا
نحن مسلمات فرنسيات ولنا حقوق
فيجب عليك كرئيس لدولة فرنسا أن تحافظ عليها

———————————————————-
We better burn our bodies than giving up our religious way of being dressed.


نفضل أن نحرق أجسادنا على أن نتنازل عن الزي الشرعي

Nous préférons brûler nos corps avant de renoncer à notre habillement religieux.

Signed by,

A French Woman
———————————————————

http://www.petitiononline.com/R2011R/petition.html

http://www.rasoulallah.net/


جزاكم الله خيرا


Notes on sadd udh-dharaa’i’

given by Sh. Muhammad Al-Jeezaanee

from Madeenah University:

Sadd udh-Dharaai: An Important Principle

What does adh-dharaai mean

Adh-Dharaai is the plural of dhareeah

Linguistically: A dhareeah is anything that leads to something else, good OR bad.

Examples:

a) Working the soil & planting seeds are dharaai that lead to a good harvest

b) Studying hard is a dhareeah that leads to good test results

Technically: The scholars of Usool use the word dhareeah is two different ways.

* The first meaning is general. It carries the same meaning as the liguistic meaning and includes anything that is a means to any goal.

Example: Walking to the masjid is a dhareeah to performing prayer

(Note: Al-Hiyal, Al-Wasaail, Al-Asbaab, Ash-Shuroot, any action that a goal can not be achieved without, Masaalih Mursalah, etc. can all be included under this very general meaning of dhareeah.)

* The second meaning is much more specific. Here dhareeah means any mubaah action that leads to a haraam action/mafsadah. Both the action itself and the result have been specified. When scholars of Usool use the term dhareeah, they are USUALLY using it in this specific sense.

Examples:

a) In soorat ul-Anaam, Allaah forbids cursing the idols etc. that the kuffaar worship so that it does not lead the kuffaar to cursing Allaah. Cursing these false dieties is in itself halaal, perhaps even recommended in some instances, but when cursing the idols can lead to Allaah being cursed it becomes haraam.

b) Allaah forbids women from hitting the ground hard with their feet when wearing an anklet. Walking in that manner is in itself allowed, but when the anklet makes a jingling noise it leads to fitnah when the men hear the sound. So because this walking leads to fitnah it is prohibitted saddan lil-dhareeah.

c) Selling knives is mubaah.. but if the seller knows that the person buying the knife wants to use it to kill someone selling the knife becomes haraam.

d) Selling grapes is mubaah.. but if the seller knows that the one purchasing is buying the grapes to make wine it becomes haraam. This is because this selling leads to the haraam.

The Relationship Between Sadd Adh-Dharaai and Other Common Terms

We will be comparing Sadd udh-Dharaai (specific meaning) with Al-Wasaail, Al-Hiyal, and Al-Masaalih Al-Mursalah.

* Sadd Udh-Dharaai VS Al-Wasaail

Similarity: Dhareeah and Waseelah both share the same linguistic meaning, the means to something or an action that leads to something.

Differences Between Waseelah and Dhareeah (#2): Dhareeah is more general than Waseelah from one perspective BUT Waseelah is more general than Dhareeah from another perspective. (Umoom wa Khusoos Wajhee)

First Perspective:

*Wasaail are more general in their outcome, i.e. the outcome can be positive or negative

*The outcome of the dhareeah can only be negative ( a mafsadah )

Second Perspective:

* Dharaai include ANY action which leads to haraam.They are more general in this sense

* Wasaail are restricted by the condition that there is purpose behind that action

Examples of Dhareeah:

(a) When the Muslims curse the idols of the kuffaar, it is not their intention to make the kuffaar curse Allaah. That is not the purpose behind their action. So cursing the kuffar idols is a dhareeah and not a waseelah.

(b) If a woman were to hit the ground with her feet making a tempting sound with her anklet, would be allowed if it were not her intention to cause fitnah? NO. That action of hers is a dhareeah to fitnah, intention and purpose are not taken into account, just the fact that the action leads to haraam.

You do not have to know the outcome or intend the outcome in the case of a dhareeah. You can be ignorant of the outcome of your action, but your action will still cause it.

Example of Waseelah:

(a) Walking or driving to a place to seek knowledge. There was purpose behind that walking.

Let us say the lady who hit the ground with her feet did that to cause fitnah.. her action would be a dhareeah AND a waseelah because now it includes purpose.

* Sadd udh-Dharaai VS Al-Hiyal

A heelah is a way of achieving a goal in an indirect or hidden way. Usually, hiyal are blameworthy (madhmoom) but may occasionally be worthy of praise (mahmood).

An example of a heelah mahmoodah can be found in the story of Ayoob when he took an oath to hit his wife 100 lashes. In order for him to fulfil his oath Allaah ordered him to take 100 sticks, tie them together and hit his wife one time. This way he evaded having to hit his wife 100 times and fulfilled his oath. The purpose here was noble.

An example of Heelah madhmoomah (blameworthy) is when a man has divorced his wife three times and can no longer marry her without her marrying another man first.. so he makes a deal with someone to marry her for a short time and then divorce her so that he can remarry her. This is called Nikaah al-Tahdeed.

Similarities between Al-Hiyal and Adh-Dharaai:

*The action itself is not the issue, rather the outcome of the action.

*There are specific examples of each in the shareeah. For example the story of Ayoob (AS) (acceptable heelah) and the story of how some fishermen of Banoo Israaeel used to set their nets the night before Saturday because all the fish would come on Saturday and they were forbidden to work (fish) on Saturday (blameworthy heelah). However, there are also other hiyal not mentioned in the shareeah like performing a specific business transaction while trying to evade ribaa in a roundabout way . The same applies to dharaai. Some dharaai are specifically mentioned in the shareeah (ex. cursing idols) while many new ones come up.

Differences between Hiyal and Dharaai:

*Heelah requires intention. You are intentially trying to evade something haraam.. as we said before dhareeah does not require intention.

*In the case of dhareeah, the outcome is clear and direct. As for a heelah, it is hidden. (-roundabout way of achieving goal,which is to evade the haraam)

Note: If a heelah results in good (as in the case of Ayyoob, AS) is is good. However, if it results in bad (playing a trick to fish when they were not supposed to) then the heelah is bad.

Sadd udh-Dharaai VS Al-Masaalih Al-Mursalah

Maslaha is very general term and includes anything that will lead to benefit. Examples of masaalih are building traffic lights and providing formal training for soldiers. Masaalih achieve general goals (maqaasid) of the shareeah but they do not have specific daleels.

Similarities: *Again, they both lead to something.

Differences: * A maslahah leads to good. A dhareeah leads to bad.

*Dharaai have either specific OR general proofs. A maslahah only has general proof. (It still has proof from Quraan, Sunnah, Ijmaa, or Qiyaas but just not specific.)

*Masaalih require thinking, planning, evaluation, intention etc.

Types of Dharaai

There are three types of dharaai.

(1) Dharaai for which there is ijmaa that they must be blocked. These are dharaai that directly and clearly lead to an obvious bad/ evil result. Examples would be digging a hole in the middle of public street, pouring poison in a bowl of soup that someone is going to eat, or cursing the idols of people who you know will surely curse Allaah in return.

(2) Dharaai for which there is ijmaa that they must be ignored and not taken into consideration. A farmer planting grapes might eventually lead to someone making wine out of them. Does that mean we should forbid farmers from planting grapes? NO. The link is weak, clear, rare. How about building mosque walls, especially ones like the Haram, Al-Masjid un-Nabawee, Almasjid ul-Aqsaa, Masjid Qubaa etc.? This may lead to people wiping their hands on these walls for blessing. Should we block the building of these masjids then? NO. What about apartment buildings? Having homes so close together could cause fitnah because women and men will be using the same entrance and may meet each other easily and frequently. So should we avoid having apartment building. NO. In all these cases the undesired outcome is indirect or unlikely.

(3) Dharaai for which there is khilaaf. Some say they should be blocked while others have the opinion that they should not. An example is Rent-to-Own. Some will argue that this may lead to things like someone being harmed, or having haraam income, or ribaa. Others say no this is a maslahah, it has benefit and makes things easy for people. These kinds of dharaai need a case by case evaluation and should not be given a general ruling. Specific fatwaa should be taken from a person of knowledge in the field after he evaluates the particular case and surrounding situation etc.

Conditions for a dhareeah that needs to be blocked.

There are three conditions.

(1) It must result in a mafsadah (bad/evil/haraam outcome). Ex. Hitting the ground with foot when wearing khulkhaal leads to a mafsadah.

(2) That the outcome is likely and directly linked. (ghaaliban, raajihan, qareeban). This may vary depending on culture and other factors. For example if we know that a particular person that worships an idol would never curse Allaah if we cursed his idol.. then in this case the dahreeah would not need to be blocked.

(3) That blocking the dhareeah does not lead to a greater evil taking place. If, for example, you did not sell the grapes to the wine maker, you know he will then steal them for sure. Here it may be better to sell.

Proof that Sadd udh-Dharaai is an Asl among the Usool of shareeah that needs to be considerred

Proof One: After Fat-h Makkah, the Prophet (SAS) told Aaishah that had her tribe (Quraysh) not been recent to Islaam, he would have knocked down the kabah and rebuilt it on the qawaaid of Ibraaheem. Many years later and after Islaam was widespread, Ibn Az-Zubayr knocked it down and built it upon qawaaid Ibraaheem as the Prophet (SAS) indicated it should be. Banu Umayyah then knocked it down again so that it would be like it was during the time of the Prophet (SAS). One of the Abbassid khaleefahs wanted to knock it down again to build it the way the Prophet (SAS) wanted it and so he asked Imam Maliks advice. Imaam Malik said not to so the house of Allaah would not become like a toy in the hands of rulers..one building and one knocking down. So even if it is better that it be built on qawaaid Ibraaheem he ruled against it, blocking the dhareeah of the kabah becoming a plaything in the hands of rulers.

Proof 2: Ibnul Qayyim and some other students asked Ibn Taymiyyah whether they should forbid the Tattaar from drinking wine. Forbidding the evil is even an obligation but Ibn Taymiyyah ruled against it saying it is better for them to drink then to come and hurt and harrass us. He was trying to block something that might lead to a greater harm.

Proof 3: The Prophet (SAS) refrained from killing Abdullaah bin Ubayy even though he was a known hypocrite. He said the reason was that so people would not end up saying that Muhammad kills his companions.

All scholars use the principle of Sadd udh-Dharaai. The difference is that some of them consider it included in Dalaalat un-Nass (from Quraan, Sunnah, Ijmaa, Qiyaas) while others count it as a separate Asl. So really it is not a difference, either way they are using sadd udh-dharaai.

Peoples position regarding sadd udh-dharaai between the two extremes of exaggeration and negligence.

The middle path is the one that ensures that the goals of the shareeah (maqaasid) are met.

* The Prophet (SAS) forbade building on a grave. This is to block the dhareeah to over-honoring the grave which can be a form of shirk.

Someone may come and take this to the extreme of forbidding anyone from sitting on a grave or standing on it. Another may not give graves the respect they deserve. The middle path is not to glorify the grave nor disrespect it.

* The Prophet (SAS) has placed conditions for a valid marriage contract to block it from becoming similar to an illicet relationship.

Someone may take this to one extreme and say that the marriage is invalid if there was no waleemah and proper announcement or mahr.. etc. Another may take another extreme and say there is no need for a walee or witnesses etc. causing the marriage contract to become very similar to sifaah.

Additional examples of sadd udh-dharaai

* The forbidding of a man and woman to sit together alone.

* The forbidding of a woman to travel alone.

* Lowering ones gaze (Speaker again notes that intention does not matter when dharaai are being blocked. Even if it were ones intention to contemplate upon the beaty of Allaahs creation it would still be forbidden to look at someone of the opposite gender. This applies to men and women, whether attractive or not.)

* The forbidding of a women to wear perfume in front of non-mahram men.

* Keeping boys and girls sleeping areas separate.

* Women clapping instead of making tasbeeh during salaah.

* The forbidding of a woman to describe another woman to her husband (The shaikh then joked that this included describing another woman to other men in her family..this is probably more common.. as women are not as likely to decribe other women to their own husband. The shaikh also mentions that if one expects that a particular woman will describe her to men then she should wear hijaab in front of her- this is sadd lil-dhareeah too.)

Notes taken by nasirmuzaffar from Multaqa Ahlal-Hadeeth

Security Implications of the Global Financial Crisis

March 4, 2009


Global Security and Intelligence Report

By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart

As anyone with a stock portfolio knows, it is a rough time for the markets. With many portfolios down 50 percent or more, this large loss of equity and wealth has been very difficult on individuals and corporations. The problems, of course, have not been confined to the stock markets. With property values plunging and variable-rate mortgages ballooning, many homeowners are also caught in a bad situation — the number of homeowners behind in their mortgage payments has been increasing and the number of foreclosures has grown. Unemployment is also an issue. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in January 2009 there were 2,227 mass layoff actions in the United States involving 237,902 workers.

Significantly, the financial crisis is not just restricted to the United States — it is a global event that is also having a severe impact on economies in Europe, Asia and the developing world. Things are tough all over, and this financial strain will create some large security problems for corporations and governments.

Threats to the Bottom Line

During times of financial hardship, companies often have to make cuts like the aforementioned layoffs. When companies plan cuts, they often focus on eliminating those corporate functions that do not appear to be contributing to the company’s profitability. And one of the first functions cut during tough times often is corporate security. A security department typically has a pretty substantial budget (it costs a lot for all those guards, access-control devices, cameras and alarms), and security is usually viewed as detracting from, rather than contributing to, the company’s bottom line. The “fat” security budget is seen as an easy place to quickly reduce costs in an effort to balance the profit-and-loss statement.

This view of security is due to a number of factors. First, it must be recognized that there are certainly some security programs that are indeed bloated and ill-conceived that have consumed far too many corporate resources for the results they produce. Furthermore, there is a long tradition of corporate security directors who are not good communicators and who do not take the effort to educate upper management about ways their programs contribute to corporate goals. However, even when a security director has an effective program and is a good communicator, it can be very difficult to quantify the losses that the corporation did not suffer due to the presence of effective security measures. The lack of losses and incidents due to a robust security program can be interpreted by some to mean that there is no threat to guard against. Indeed, effective security can make it appear that there is no need for security, a paradox we have also seen in the historical pattern of U.S. government security funding — a pattern that has resulted in a number of disastrous attacks against U.S. embassies.

In times of economic hardship, the relentless focus on operating expenses and even corporate cutbacks can lead to definite security challenges. As we discussed last November, one of these problems is workplace violence, but during times when people are hurting financially, issues such as employee theft, fraud and product theft by non-employees must also be carefully monitored.

However, while the theft of a tractor-trailer full of computers or flat screen televisions can quickly get someone’s attention, there is a far more subtle, and no less dangerous, threat lurking just under the surface. That threat is espionage — both corporate and state-sponsored.

The Human-Intelligence Process

Espionage is always a problem corporations must face. Competitors, criminals and even foreign governments often seek ways to gather proprietary information from companies, sometimes to boost their own operational capacities (e.g., to apply critical or emerging technologies to their weapons programs) and sometimes to sell on the open market.

Once a company has been identified as having the information sought, the first thing the human-intelligence practitioner will do is look for weak links in the targeted company’s operations. If the required information is readily available, there is no need to undertake a time-intensive and costly operation to retrieve it. Indeed, it is shocking to see the amount of sensitive and critical information that is openly available on the Internet and in research libraries, or that is freely given out at technical conferences.

When open source collection efforts fail, more invasive measures must be employed. Sometimes the required information can be obtained via technical surveillance. A faulty information technology system, for example, can expose the company’s secrets via remote electronic intrusion conducted from a continent away. Other times, information can be obtained by eavesdropping on telephone calls made by corporate leaders or by using other technical surveillance measures.

However, technical surveillance has its limitations, and sometimes critical information must be obtained through human intelligence, which means obtaining the required data from an employee working within the targeted company. Due to human nature, human-intelligence practitioners use the same time-tested principles in the recruitment of corporate sources that they use when recruiting sources in the government sector. (The risks associated with obtaining unclassified proprietary information from private companies are often far less than those associated with obtaining classified information from government agencies or national research laboratories.)

The first step in the human-intelligence process is called spotting. This is when the human-intelligence practitioner attempts to identify those workers who have access to the required information. Then the practitioner conducts a thorough examination of the backgrounds and situations of the employees who have that access in an effort to determine which employee is most vulnerable to exploitation. Employees who are in dire need of extra cash to maintain extravagant lifestyles or to support drinking, drug or gambling habits, or those who are hiding extramarital affairs or other secrets that can be used for blackmail, make prime candidates. A background check might also reveal that a certain worker is angry with his or her employer over issues of salary or placement in the company. There also are employees who disagree ideologically with the product their company makes or the process the company uses to produce it. Finally, there are the employees whose egos are so big that they might be willing to risk committing industrial espionage just to prove they can get away with it. Robert Hanssen, an ex-FBI special agent accused of selling secrets to Russia, was motivated by the belief that he was above the system and could commit espionage without being caught.

Of the four major motivations for committing espionage — money, ideology, compromise and ego (known to security officials as MICE) — money has proven to be the No. 1 motivation, though two or more motivations can be used to turn an employee. More often than not, simple bribery is sufficient to obtain the desired information, especially if the employee is living beyond his or her means for one reason or another. Outside agents looking to turn an employee can also use blackmail (“compromise” in the MICE acronym). Demanding proprietary information in exchange for not exposing a personal secret, for instance, is a cost-effective approach that also allows the agent to return again and again to the same source. This method is a bit riskier, however, since it can cause more resentment than other means and make the source more likely to rebel. However, sexual entrapment and blackmail is still widely used as a recruitment tactic, one that has been used with great success in recent years by the Chinese government against targets such as Japanese and Taiwanese government officials, FBI special agents — and foreign businessmen.

Emphasizing the ‘M’

Once the practitioner has identified the weakest link, decided on the approach to take and made a specific plan on how to proceed, the next step in the human-intelligence process is to actually approach the employee and “pitch” him or her. This step is often a gradual effort to establish a relationship of trust between the practitioner and the employee, and contact can begin gradually with requests for small, seemingly harmless bits of information such as internal phone numbers. In this approach, known as the “little hook,” the employee is offered “gifts” in exchange for these favors. The requests gradually become greater in scope until the targeted information is obtained. Other times, the pitch is far more blatant and the human-intelligence practitioner does not take the time to establish a relationship or gradually recruit the target. Instead the practitioner makes a flat-out cash offer for the required goods or shows the target the e vidence that will be used for blackmail.

In the current economic environment, with many 401(k) plans now more like 201(k)s, stock options severely underwater and homeowners facing foreclosure, cold hard cash — the M in MICE — is an even more attractive approach. In fact, with employees seeing their investment accounts decline dramatically, and perhaps even facing the possibility of home foreclosure, it is not at all unreasonable to anticipate that companies and foreigners will face a windfall of walk-in sources who will volunteer to sell critical information — and in such a buyer’s market, information can often be bought at fire-sale prices. Employees attempting to sell proprietary information are somewhat common; one of the most publicized examples of this in recent years was the disgruntled Coca-Cola Co. employee who was arrested in July 2006 after attempting to sell Coke’s recipe to rival soft drink company Pepsi.

Mass layoffs also complicate the equation, especially when some of the employees being laid off have access to critical information. If measures are not taken to ensure that the information is protected, the information could easily find itself in the hands of competing companies or even foreign intelligence services.

Not Just a Corporate Concern

The current financial crisis — and vulnerability to espionage — is not just confined to the private sector. There are many federal government employees in the United States who have watched their investments in the stock-based funds of the government’s Thrift Savings Plan wither on the vine over the past two years, and judging from the performance of foreign stock exchanges, the investments of employees in other governments have followed suit. Additionally, government employees tend to live in places with very expensive real estate, like Washington, London, Paris and Tokyo. This means that a foreign intelligence officer armed only with a briefcase full of dollars, euros or yen can make a substantial amount of money. With many corporate security departments being cut to the bone, many internal security services focused on the counterterrorism mission and many law enforcement agencies chasing white-collar criminals, it is a good time to be in the intelligen ce business.

One day we will look back on this time through a counterintelligence lens and see that, although it was a time of bear stock markets, it was a tremendous bull market for practitioners of human intelligence.

Tell Stratfor What You Think

This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com

Turkey and Russia on the Rise

March 17, 2009


Graphic for Geopolitical Intelligence Report

By Reva Bhalla, Lauren Goodrich and Peter Zeihan

Russian President Dmitri Medvedev reportedly will travel to Turkey in the near future to follow up a recent four-day visit by his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gul, to Moscow. The Turks and the Russians certainly have much to discuss.

Russia is moving aggressively to extend its influence throughout the former Soviet empire, while Turkey is rousing itself from 90 years of post-Ottoman isolation. Both are clearly ascendant powers, and it would seem logical that the more the two bump up against one other, the more likely they will gird for yet another round in their centuries-old conflict. But while that may be true down the line, the two Eurasian powers have sufficient strategic incentives to work together for now.

Russia’s World

Russia is among the world’s most strategically vulnerable states. Its core, the Moscow region, boasts no geographic barriers to invasion. Russia must thus expand its borders to create the largest possible buffer for its core, which requires forcibly incorporating legions of minorities who do not see themselves as Russian. The Russian government estimates that about 80 percent of Russia’s approximately 140 million people are actually ethnically Russian, but this number is somewhat suspect, as many minorities define themselves based on their use of the Russian language, just as many Hispanics in the United States define themselves by their use of English as their primary language. Thus, ironically, attaining security by creating a strategic buffer creates a new chronic security problem in the form of new populations hostile t o Moscow’s rule. The need to deal with the latter problem explains the development of Russia’s elite intelligence services, which are primarily designed for and tasked with monitoring the country’s multiethnic population.


Russia’s primary challenge, however, is time. In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, the bottom fell out of the Russian birthrate, with fewer than half the number of babies born in the 1990s than were born in the 1980s. These post-Cold War children are now coming of age; in a few years, their small numbers are going to have a catastrophic impact on the size of the Russian population. By contrast, most non-Russian minorities — in particular those such as Chechens and Dagestanis, who are of Muslim faith — did not suffer from the 1990s birthrate plunge, so their numbers are rapidly increasing even as the number of ethnic Russians is rapidly decreasing. Add in deep-rooted, demographic-impacting problems such as HIV, tuberculosis and heroin abuse — concentrated not just among ethnic Russians but a lso among those of childbearing age — and Russia faces a hard-wired demographic time bomb. Put simply, Russia is an ascending power in the short run, but it is a declining power in the long run.

The Russian leadership is well aware of this coming crisis, and knows it is going to need every scrap of strength it can muster just to continue the struggle to keep Russia in one piece. To this end, Moscow must do everything it can now to secure buffers against external intrusion in the not-so-distant future. For the most part, this means rolling back Western influence wherever and whenever possible, and impressing upon states that would prefer integration into the West that their fates lie with Russia instead. Moscow’s natural gas crisis with Ukraine, August 2008 war with Georgia, efforts to eject American forces from Central Asia and constant pressure on the Baltic states all represent efforts to buy Russia more space — and with that space, more time for survival.

Expanding its buffer against such a diverse and potentially hostile collection of states is no small order, but Russia does have one major advantage: The security guarantor for nearly all of these countries is the United States, and the United States is currently very busy elsewhere. So long as U.S. ground forces are occupied with the Iraqi and Afghan wars, the Americans will not be riding to the rescue of the states on Russia’s periphery. Given this window of opportunity, the Russians have a fair chance to regain the relative security they seek. In light of the impending demographic catastrophe and the present window of opportunity, the Russians are in quite a hurry to act.

Turkey’s World

Turkey is in many ways the polar opposite of Russia. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, Turkey was pared down to its core, Asia Minor. Within this refuge, Turkey is nearly unassailable. It is surrounded by water on three sides, commands the only maritime connection between the Black and Mediterranean seas and sits astride a plateau surrounded by mountains. This is a very difficult chunk of territory to conquer. Indeed, beginning in the Seljuk Age in the 11th century, the ancestors of the modern Turks took the better part of three centuries to seize this territory from its previous occupant, the Byzantine Empire.

The Turks have used much of the time since then to consolidate their position such that, as an ethnicity, they reign supreme in their realm. The Persians and Arabs have long since lost their footholds in Anatolia, while the Armenians were finally expelled in the dying days of World War I. Only the Kurds remain, and they do not pose a demographic challenge to the Turks. While Turkey exhibits many of the same demographic tendencies as other advanced developing states — namely, slowing birthrates and a steadily aging population — there is no major discrepancy between Turk and Kurdish birthrates, so the Turks should continue to comprise more than 80 percent of the country’s population for some time to come. Thus, while the Kurds will continue to be a source of nationalistic friction, they do not constitute a fundamental challenge to the power or operations of the Turkish state, like minorities in Russia are destined to do in the years ahead.

Turkey’s security is not limited to its core lands. Once one moves beyond the borders of modern Turkey, the existential threats the state faced in years past have largely melted away. During the Cold War, Turkey was locked into the NATO structure to protect itself from Soviet power. But now the Soviet Union is gone, and the Balkans and Caucasus — both former Ottoman provinces — are again available for manipulation. The Arabs have not posed a threat to Anatolia in nearly a millennium, and any contest between Turkey and Iran is clearly a battle of unequals in which the Turks hold most of the cards. If anything, the Arabs — who view Iran as a hostile power with not only a heretical religion but also with a revolutionary foreign policy calling for the overthrow of most of the Arab regimes — are practically welcoming the Turks back. Despite both its imperial past and its close security association with the Americans, the Arabs see Turkey as a trusted mediator, and even an exemplar.

With the disappearance of the threats of yesteryear, many of the things that once held Turkey’s undivided attention have become less important to Ankara. With the Soviet threat gone, NATO is no longer critical. With new markets opening up in the former Soviet Union, Turkey’s obsession with seeking EU membership has faded to a mere passing interest. Turkey has become a free agent, bound by very few relationships or restrictions, but dabbling in events throughout its entire periphery. Unlike Russia, which feels it needs an empire to survive, Turkey is flirting with the idea of an empire simply because it can — and the costs of exploring the option are negl igible.

Whereas Russia is a state facing a clear series of threats in a very short time frame, Turkey is a state facing a veritable smorgasbord of strategic options under no time pressure whatsoever. Within that disconnect lies the road forward for the two states — and it is a road with surprisingly few clashes ahead in the near term.

The Field of Competition

There are four zones of overlapping interest for the Turks and Russians.

First, the end of the Soviet empire opened up a wealth of economic opportunities, but very few states have proven adept at penetrating the consumer markets of Ukraine and Russia. Somewhat surprisingly, Turkey is one of those few states. Thanks to the legacy of Soviet central planning, Russian and Ukrainian industry have found it difficult to retool away from heavy industry to produce the consumer goods much in demand in their markets. Because most Ukrainians and Russians cannot afford Western goods, Turkey has carved out a robust and lasting niche with its lower-cost exports; it is now the largest supplier of imports to the Russian market. While this is no exercise in hard power, this Turkish penetration nevertheless is cause for much concern among Russian authorities.

So far, Turkey has been scrupulous about not politicizing these useful trade links beyond some intelligence-gathering efforts (particularly in Ukraine). Considering Russia’s current financial problems, having a stable source of consumer goods — especially one that is not China — is actually seen as a positive. At least for now, the Russian government would rather see its trade relationship with Turkey stay strong. There will certainly be a clash later — either as Russia weakens or as Turkey becomes more ambitious — but for now, the Russians are content with the trade relationship.

Second, the Russian retreat in the post-Cold War era has opened up the Balkans to Turkish influence. Romania, Bulgaria and the lands of the former Yugoslavia are all former Ottoman possessions, and in their day they formed the most advanced portion of the Ottoman economy. During the Cold War, they were all part of the Communist world, with Romania and Bulgaria formally incorporated into the Soviet bloc. While most of these lands are now absorbed into the European Union, Russia’s ties to its fellow Slavs — most notably the Serbs and Bulgarians — have allowed it a degree of influence that most Europeans choose to ignore. Additionally, Russia has long held a friendly relationship with Greece and Cyprus, both to complicate American policy in Europe and to provide a flank against Turkey. Still, thanks to proximity and trading links, Turkey clearly holds the upper hand in this theater of competition.

But this particular region is unlikely to generate much Turkish-Russian animosity, simply because both countries are in the process of giving up.

Most of the Balkan states are already members of an organization that is unlikely to ever admit Russia or Turkey: the European Union. Russia simply cannot meet the membership criteria, and Cyprus’ membership in essence strikes the possibility of Turkish inclusion. (Any EU member can veto the admission of would-be members.) The EU-led splitting of Kosovo from Serbia over Russian objections was a body blow to Russian power in the region, and the subsequent EU running of Kosovo as a protectorate greatly limited Turkish influence as well. Continuing EU expansion means that Turkish influence in the Balkans will shrivel just as Russian influence already has. Trouble this way lies, but not between Turkey and Russia. If anything, their joint exclusion might provide some room for the two to agree on something.

The third area for Russian-Turkish competition is in energy, and this is where things get particularly sticky. Russia is Turkey’s No. 1 trading partner, with energy accounting for the bulk of the trade volume between the two countries. Turkey depends on Russia for 65 percent of its natural gas and 40 percent of its oil imports. Though Turkey has steadily grown its trade relationship with Russia, it does not exactly approve of Moscow’s penchant for using its energy relations with Europe as a political weapon. Russia has never gone so far as to cut supplies to Turkey directly, but Turkey has been indirectly affected more than once when Russia decided to cut supplies to Ukraine because Moscow felt the need to reassert its writ in Kiev.

Sharing the Turks’ energy anxiety, the Europeans have been more than eager to use Turkey as an energy transit hub for routes that would bypass the Russians altogether in supplying the European market. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is one such route, and others, like Nabucco, are still stuck in the planning stages. The Russians have every reason to pressure the Turks into staying far away from any more energy diversification schemes that could cost Russia one of its biggest energy clients — and deny Moscow much of the political leverage it currently holds over the Europeans who are dependent on the Russian energy network.

There are only two options for the Turks in diversifying away from the Russians. The first lies to Turkey’s south in Iraq and Iran. Turkey has big plans for Iraq’s oil industry, but it will still take considerable time to upgrade and restore the oil fields and pipelines that have been persistently sabotaged and ransacked by insurgents during the fighting that followed the 2003 U.S. invasion. The Iranians offer another large source of energy for the Turks to tap into, but the political complications attached to dealing with Iran are still too prickly for the Turks to move ahead with concrete energy deals at this time. Complications remain for now, but Turkey wi ll be keeping an eye on its Middle Eastern neighbors for robust energy partnerships in the future.

The second potential source of energy for the Turks lies in Central Asia, a region that Russia must keep in its grip at all costs if it hopes to survive in the long run. In many ways this theater is the reverse of the Balkans, where the Russians hold the ethnic links and the Turks the economic advantage. Here, four of the five Central Asian countries — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan — are Turkic. But as a consequence of the Soviet years, the infrastructure and economies of all four are so hardwired into the Russian sphere of influence that it would take some major surgery to liberate them. But the prize is a rich one: Central Asia possesses the world& #8217;s largest concentration of untapped energy reserves. And as the term “central” implies, whoever controls the region can project power into the former Soviet Union, China and South Asia. If the Russians and Turks are going to fight over something, this is it.

Here Turkey faces a problem, however — it does not directly abut the region. If the Turks are even going to attempt to shift the Central Asian balance of power, they will need a lever. This brings us to the final — and most dynamic — realm of competition: the Caucasus.

Turkey here faces the best and worst in terms of influence projection. The Azerbaijanis do not consider themselves simply Turkic, like the Central Asians, but actually Turkish. If there is a country in the former Soviet Union that would consider not only allying with but actually joining with another state to escape Russia’s orbit, it would be Azerbaijan with Turkey. Azerbaijan has its own significant energy supplies, but its real value is in serving as a willing springboard for Turkish influence into Central Asia.

However, the core of Azerbaijan does not border Turkey. Instead, it is on the other side of Armenia, a country that thrashed Azerbaijan in a war over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and still has lingering animosities toward Ankara because of the 1915 Armenian “genocide.” Armenia has sold itself to the Russians to keep its Turkish foes at bay.

This means Turkish designs on Central Asia all boil down to the former Soviet state of Georgia. If Turkey can bring Georgia fully under its wing, Turkey can then set about to integrate with Azerbaijan and project influence into Central Asia. But without Georgia, Turkey is hamstrung before it can even begin to reach for the real prize in Central Asia.

In this, the Turks do not see the Georgians as much help. The Georgians do not have much in the way of a functional economy or military, and they have consistently overplayed their hand with the Russians in the hopes that the West would come to their aid. Such miscalculations contributed to the August 2008 Georgian-Russian war, in which Russia smashed what military capacity the Georgians did possess. So while Ankara sees the Georgians as reliably anti-Russian, it does not see them as reliably competent or capable.

This means that Turkish-Russian competition may have been short-circuited before it even began. Meanwhile, the Americans and Russians are beginning to outline the rudiments of a deal. Various items on the table include Russia allowing the Americans to ship military supplies to Afghanistan via Russia’s sphere of influence, changes to the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, and a halt to NATO expansion. The last prong is a critical piece of Russian-Turkish competition. Should the Americans and Europeans put their weight behind NATO expansion, Georgia would be a logical candidate — meaning most of the heavy lifting in terms of Turkey projecting power eastward would already be done. But if the Americans and Europeans do not put their weight behind NATO expansion, Georgia would fall by the wayside and Turkey would have to do all the work of projecting power eastward — and facing the Russians — alone.

A Temporary Meeting of Minds?

There is clearly no shortage of friction points between the Turks and the Russians. With the two powers on a resurgent path, it was only a matter of time before they started bumping into one another. The most notable clash occurred when the Russians decided to invade Georgia last August, knowing full well that neither the Americans nor the Europeans would have the will or capability to intervene on behalf of the small Caucasian state. NATO’s strongest response was a symbolic show of force that relied on Turkey, as the gatekeeper to the Black Sea, to allow a buildup of NATO vessels near the Georgian coast and threaten the underbelly of Russia’s former Soviet peri phery.

Turkey disapproved of the idea of Russian troops bearing down in the Caucasus near the Turkish border, and Ankara was also angered by having its energy revenues cut off during the war when the BTC pipeline was taken offline.

The Russians promptly responded to Turkey’s NATO maneuvers in the Black Sea by holding up a large amount of Turkish goods at various Russian border checkpoints to put the squeeze on Turkish exports. But the standoff was short-lived; soon enough, the Turks and Russians came to the negotiating table to end the trade spat and sort out their respective spheres of influence. The Russian-Turkish negotiations have progressed over the past several months, with Russian and Turkish leaders now meeting fairly regularly to sort out the issues where both can find some mutual benefit.

The first area of cooperation is Europe, where both Russia and Turkey have an interest in applying political pressure. Despite Europe’s objections and rejections, the Turks are persistent in their ambitions to become a member of the European Union. At the same time, the Russians need to keep Europe linked into the Russian energy network and divided over any plans for BMD, NATO expansion or any other Western plan that threatens Russian national security. As long as Turkey stalls on any European energy diversification projects, the more it can demand Europe’s attention on the issue of EU membership. In fact, the Turks already threatened as much at the start of the year, when they said outright that if Europe doesn’t need Turkey as an EU member, then Turkey doesn’t need to sign off on any more energy diversification projects that transit Turkish territory. Ankara’s threats against Europe dovetailed nicely with Russia’s natural gas cutoff to Ukraine in January, when the Europeans once again were reminded of Moscow’s energy wrath.

The Turks and the Russians also can find common ground in the Middle East. Turkey is again expanding its influence deep into its Middle Eastern backyard, and Ankara expects to take the lead in handling the thorny issues of Iran, Iraq and Syria as the United States draws down its presence in the region and shifts its focus to Afghanistan. What the Turks want right now is stability on their southern flank. That means keeping Russia out of mischief in places like Iran, where Moscow has threatened to sell strategic S-300 air defense systems and to boost the Iranian nuclear program in order to grab Washington’s attention on other issues deemed vital to Moscow’s national security interests. The United States is already leaning on Russia to pressure Iran in return for other strategic concessions, and the Turks are just as interested as the Americans in taming Russia’s actions in the Middle East.

Armenia is another issue where Russia and Turkey may be having a temporary meeting of minds. Russia unofficially occupies Armenia and has been building up a substantial military presence in the small Caucasian state. Turkey can either sit back, continue to isolate Armenia and leave it for the Russians to dominate through and through, or it can move toward normalizing relations with Yerevan and dealing with Russia on more equal footing in the Caucasus. With rumors flying of a deal on the horizon between Yerevan and Ankara (likely with Russia’s blessing), it appears more and more that the Turks and the Russians are making progress in sorting out their respective spheres of influence.

Ultimately, both Russia and Turkey know that this relationship is likely temporary at best. The two Eurasian powers still distrust each other and have divergent long-term goals, even if in the short term there is a small window of opportunity for Turkish and Russian interests to overlap. The law of geopolitics dictates that the two ascendant powers are doomed to clash — just not today.

This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com

This was a minor topic of debate amongst the Muslim theologians of various creedal affiliations. I bring the following material to shed some light into the subject. The issue is regarding the concept of acquisition (kasb) which is being responsible for actions and are actions of created beings created by themselves. This topic is an interesting study particularly since it is rarely discussed even in major knowledge based Islamic forums.

Imam al-Laqani states the following,

“وعندنا للعبد كسب كلفـا …. و لم يكن مؤثرا فلتعرفا

فليس مجبورا ولا اختيارا …. وليـس كـلا يفعـل اختيـارا

فإن يثبنا فبمحض الفضل …. وإن يعـذب فبمحـص العـدل

i.e. “We hold that the slave has acquisition and has been made responsible but he does not effect. He is thus neither compelled without choice nor does he create his actions.”

While Imaam al-Laqaani, the Maliki scholar is Ash’ari in his creedal affiliation, he has agreed with the classical hanbalis and has somewhat opposed Imam Abu Hasan al-Ash’ari on this issue.

I will continue to bring authoritative Sunni Theologians on this very point.

In order for a more accurate picture, one has to know the origination of views. In fact, the basis of this discussion is based on the two things I just mentioned
1. the role of how the groups have viewed atomism
2. knowing the origination of views and for what purpose they were formulated.

Ibn Taymiyyah, being the master of articulation within the subjects discussed concerning theology and the various views of individuals and groups and being knowledgable of the intricate aspects of their origin I believe is most suitable to bring forth in this matter. Listen to the following kalaam where he says the following (I wish I can type it all up but its two long) in his book Kitaabul-Emaan (Book of Faith)

“The point behind the present discussion has been to raise the issue of Allah’s divine decree. It has been established in Sahih Muslim on the authority of Abdullah bin Amr that the prophet salallahu alaihi wa sallam said
‘With His Throne over the waters, Allah foreordained the fates of His creatures 50 thousand years before He created the heavens and the earth’
and we read in sahih al-Bukharee on the authority of Imran Bin Husayn that the prophet salallahu alaihi wa sallam said
‘He is and nothign existed before Him. His Throne is upon the waters, and He records everything in the Reminder (Qur’an). Then He created the heavens and the earth’
And we have several accounts in the two books (Saheehayn) on the authority of the prophet alaihi salatu salam according to which Allah knew from the beginning who would enter Paradise and who would enter Hell, and what human beings would do before they had done it.

We also read in the saheehayn on the authority of Abdullah ibn Mas’ud that after Allah creates someone’s body and before breathing life into it, He send forth an Angel who records the time when the person is destined to die, the type of livelihood we will enjoy, and the actions he will perform, as well as whether he will be blessed or damned. Other hadeeth such as these will be discussed in the proper place inshallah. This notion of predestination (Qadr) has been decried by the qadarite sect which arose during the later days of the companions of the Prophet. It has been related that the first person to innovate this sects teachings in Iraq was a man from Basrah by the name of Sibawayh, originally a zoroastrian. His teachings were then passed on to a man named Ma’baad al-Juhani. It is also said that one of the first events [to inspire this teaching] took place in the Hijaaz, namely the burning of the kaaba. After it occurred, one man said that it burned down by Allah’s decree, to which someone else replied that no, Allah decreed no such thing! However during the days of the rightly guided Caliphs, no one ever dared question the notion of Divine Predestination (al-qadr). So when those of the qadarite sect first began denying this notion, they were condemned for it by the surviving companions of the Prophet, among them Abdulah ibn Umar, Abdullah Ibn Abbass, and Waathilah ibn Aswa. Most supporters of the new teachings were to be found in Basrah and Syria, while a few of them resided in the Hijaaz. The salaf had a great deal to say in criticism of the qadarite sect.

According to Waki ibnul-Jarrah (Imaam Maalik’s teacher) followers of the qadarite sect holds that the result of Allah’s commands will only become manifest in the future. And that Allah did not foreordain what people had written or what they had done.
The Murji’s however hold that one’s words may be separated from what one does, whereas according to the Jahmis, knowledge may be separated from both one’s words and actions. Concerning all such views, Waki said
‘This, all of this, is kufr (disbelief)” it was narrated by Ibn…
[in the manuscripts the name has been erased through time and therefore blank]

However, when writings on Divine Predestination spread and became more well known with participation of numerous speculative thinkers and others, the majority of those who had embraced the qadarites teachings began to accept the notion of divine foreknowledge, although they still denied the Absolute Will and Creation. We have two different accounts on the authority of Amr ibnul-Ubayd (the Mutazili) concerning the denial of the existence of a pre-existing book [i.e. the Qur'an]. This view was denounced by Maalik (Imam Maalik), Shafi’ee, Ahmad [bin Hanbal], and others who declared them [the qadarites] to be kaafirs (disbelievers) on account of it. There are many scholars and others who have written in favor of the notion of Divine Foreknowledge and whose views have been passed down by al-Bukhaaree and Muslim. However, they do not set forth the views of those who advocated this notion. This was the doctrine taught by the Hadeeth scholars (ahlul-hadeeth) who were also Islamic jurists, such as Ahmad [Bin Hanbal] and others, namely, that whoever was advocating a heretical teaching deserves to be punished in order that other people may be protected from any harm which he might bring upon them. The lightest punishment he might receive is ostracism, so that he would no longer enjoy any status within Islam, his testimony would no longer be accepted, nor would he be consulted or allowed to teach or to be appointed as a judge. The teaching of Maalik (Imaam Maalik) is similar to this, hence, compilers of prophetic traditions did not record the views of individuals who were propagating any sort of heretical doctrine. However, they, and other scholars did record the views of many who secretly agreed with the teachigns of the qadarites, Murjites, Kharijites, and Shi’ites, and others.

[Check this out]
Ahmad [ibn Hanbal] once said that ‘if we failed to relate the teachings of the qadarites, we would be leaving out the views of most of the inhabitants of Basrah. This was because the question of whether the actions of the human beings are “created”, and concerning the wills of “creatures” is a problematic one’
And just as those Mutazilites who held qadarite views erred in their thinking, so also did many of those who sought to refute their teachings. For in their attempts to refute their views, they followed in the footsteps of Jahm ibn Safwan and his followers, denying the wisdom of Allah and His acts of creating and commanding, in His Mercy towards His servants, as well as the causes for Creation and Commands. In fact, they so thoroughly repudiated existing realities evident in Allah’s creatures and laws that they alienated most prudent thinkers who had understood their claims concerning what they believed to be orthodox Islam. That is, they were making the claim that the views of orthodox muslims on predestination were the same as those introduced by Jahm”

Now, Haafidh Ibnul-Qayyim has complexity of statements where he dissects this issue in a detailed manner and elaborating upon it within the confines of the Salafi methodology regarding the Islamic creed.

in his book ash-Shifa (the entire title is “Shif’aa al-’Aleel f īma ‘il al-qada wal-qadar wal-hikma wa-ta’līl “)

Regarding predestination, the correct Sunnī belief was neither determinism nor belief in free will. It was a compromise between these two extremes, a true middle road ( al-madhhab al-wasat ). This belief acknowledges God’s omnipotence and the predestination of man’s acts, but at the same time considers man as a responsible actor. Man exercises his choice ( ikhtiyar ) and will ( iraada ), and then carries out ( fa’ala ) his actions. The book ash-Shifaa ‘ is devoted to explaining how it is possible to combine these two apparently contradictory views.

In essence, the quote of Imaam Laqaani above, surprisingly yet not, is a regurgitation of Ibnul-Qayyim’s doctrine in simplified format which is why I have stated that he has agreed with the hanbalis on this very point

Which means, what is the position of the Ash’aris

The Ash’arite position on predestination is that God creates the actions of the servant directly without the servant himself causing that act, and that the servant then ‘acquires’ the reward or punishment of that deed. Hence, there is only an illusion of free-will, for in the end all actions are a direct result of God’s will and action. This theory, propounded by al-Ash’arī himself, is known as the theory of ‘acquisition’, or kasb. It is, of course, based directly on Ash’arite belief of God re-creating accidents within atoms at each and every second. Man, being merely the agency upon which these accidents are created, cannot actually be the cause of any of his own ‘actions’. Hence, atomism was the key factor that led Ash’arites to deny both natural causality and human free-will.

Between al-Ghazaali, Ibn Sina, and the Hanbalis

Issue: One of the main issues of theological debate was the relationship between God’s power and human acts. The Mu‘tazilites, admitting the continuation of an accident (arad) of human power, asserted that human acts were decided and produced (or even created) by people themselves; thus they justified human responsibility for acts and maintained divine justice.
In contrast, assuming that all the events in the world and human acts are caused by God’s knowledge, will and power, al-Ghazali admits two powers in human acts, God’s power and human power. Human power and act are both created by God, and so human action is God’s creation (khalq), but it is also human acquisition (kasb) of God’s action, which is reflected in human volition. Thus al-Ghazali tries to harmonize God’s omnipotence and our own responsibility for our actions.

Thus, from what I know, the hanbalis all agreed to this, including Ibn Taymiyyah. And this is the exact doctrine professed in Ibnul-Qayyim’s Shifaa al-’Aleel. there could be some slight variations, possibly differences in semantics, however, I think for the most part, hanbalis and ash’aris were in someways in unison on this point against the mutazilah (qadaris) and the philosophers wallahul-alim

Ibn Taymiyyah explains the relaionship between our will and responsibility to answer for our actions and the fact that God is the Creator of our actions due to the Islamic fundamental creedal principle of “Khalq Af’aal al-’Ibaad” (the actions of the servants are created)

Ibn Taimiyyah goes to the issue of two terms that people of his time differed on:

Khalq bi or FIIAL bi= Creation by or action by or through.

Khalq aaind or Fiaal aaind= Creation of action at.

The first is a relationship of causation and the other is a relationship of association. Something that scientists of these days deal with whenever they see two phenomena happening at the same time or shortly following each other.

Ibn Taimiyyah would go with the first rather than the second, unless an action is done directly and specifically by God, as in the creation of Adam and other things. So, the actions of man are man’s direct responsibilities and they were indirectly created by Allah. Man’s free will is responsible. God created in man the ability to do right and wrong, and either action would be indirectly created by God but the responsibility of man.

In essence, Ibn Taymiyyah has classified qadr (Divine Pre-destination and decree) into two categories

1. Qadr al-Qawni
2. Qadr ash-Shar’i

and these two can be extensively elaborated in more detail, however what is commonly accepted from these two aspects of qadr was that qadr al-qawni was a matter completely obsolete from the human experience (meaning we have no choice or say in that regard) whereas His qadr ash-Shar’i is what was part of the human experience by enacting their decision and becoming the recipients of the outcomes of those decisions, and rightfully so (meaning they would not be oppressed because they are answerable for their own actions)

Farzaneh Milani

Farzaneh Milani, professor of Persian literature and women’s studies at the University of Virginia, is also a Carnegie Fellow.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali announcing her intention to leave the Dutch parliament, The Hague, May 16, 2006. (Koen van Weel/Reuters/Landov)

In the unprecedented flourishing of writings about Islam in the United States in recent years, one category of books—life stories of women—has been the most popular, attracting the attention of politicians, publishers, the media and the reading public alike. In an old narrative frame of captivity recast for the present-day reader, some of these memoirs and autobiographies portray the Muslim woman as a virtual prisoner. She is the victim of an immobilizing faith, locked up inside her mandatory veil—a mobile prison shrunk to the size of her body.[1] She has no real voice or visibility, nowhere to escape to, no protection, no shelter, no freedom of movement. Captivity is her destiny.[2] Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the bestselling author of Infidel and The Caged Virgin who was named by Time in 2005 as one of the 100 people who shape our lives, sums up this mindset when she describes Islam as “a mental cage,” a set of “mental bars,” and Muslim women as “trapped in that cage.”[3]

The figure of the trapped Muslim woman, which stands at the center of the ongoing national debate on Islam, contrasts sharply with her representation in medieval European literature, where mainly male writers depicted her as a queen or a princess, often larger than life. Tellingly, Don Quixote de La Mancha, first published in 1605 and considered by many to be the first modern novel, is also the stage for the arrival of a veiled Muslim woman in Western literature.[4] According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “harem,” which came to be understood as a domestic penitentiary, an extension of the veil and its architectural double, entered the English language in 1634. Earlier, “seraglio,” a derivative of the Persian word saray, meaning palace, was used for Muslim women’s quarters. Demoted from a palace to a prison, the forbidden space warded off as it seduced. It appalled as it lured. Simultaneously, it represented sexual abandon and incarceration.

The emergence of the Muslim woman as prisoner in Western literature coincided with a time when work spaces and living spaces were becoming more differentiated in Europe, and the ideology of a “public sphere” for men and a “private sphere” for women was gaining ascendancy. Even as more Western women found themselves thus constrained, the sex-segregated space of the harem symbolized an absolute loss of freedom of movement that appeared worse in comparison. Embellished with a certain charm and allure, the Muslim woman was invoked in order to demonstrate denial of civic freedom. She was an expression of the conflicts and ambivalences engendered by the processes of modernization, a projection perhaps of suppressed European self-doubt and self-criticism.

The recent spate of memoirs and autobiographies involving Muslim captors and their native or non-Muslim victims, a mutant category I call “hostage narratives,” puts a new and fascinating twist on the familiar theme of women’s captivity in the Islamic world. It is no longer mainly Western men who recount the tales of confinement, but women who recount them firsthand. This is no longer an image foisted upon women; rather, it is self-perception. It is authentic. It is women’s own longing to escape, their own urgent plea to be liberated. The hostage narrative relies on the authority of personal experience, shares an insider’s perspective and commands more trust and legitimacy. Written in English, addressing Americans directly and concerned with national and international security for good measure, this category of literature fetishizes the veil.[5]

Letters by the Thousand

The American reading public, the majority of which is made up of women, according to recent statistics,[6] has an unquenchable appetite for books narrated by or about Muslim women. As soon as Sally Armstrong, then editor-in-chief of Homemaker’s magazine and one of the first journalists to focus on women under the rule of the Taliban, published an article on the subject, she received more than 9,000 letters from concerned citizens who wanted to help, according to publicity materials for her 2002 book, Veiled Threat. In 2002 alone, more books were published in the US about Afghan women than in the entire history of American letters.[7] They generated great sympathy among American readers. In contrast, memoirs of life in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, depicting the escalating violence, the institutionalization of corruption and the harsh living conditions for women, are rare.[8]

Afghan women under the oppressive rule of the Taliban swiftly became the symbol of oppression by Islam, their plight perfectly captured by the metaphor of the prisoner without a chance at parole or reprieve, without recourse to local justice. Ironically, the Taliban themselves had seized power in the name of Islam and in order to “protect” women. In fact, it was the kidnapping and rape of two women in 1994 that marked the dawn of the movement. The violated women symbolized an invaded motherland, and Afghan men became the emasculated sons who could not protect their mothers. Mourning the decline of the cherished ideals of honor and masculinity, Mullah Muhammad Omar, soon to become the shadowy leader of the Taliban, was a village preacher who claimed God directed him in a dream to save his country. He gathered some 30 like-minded men and 16 rifles, killed the rapists and vowed to shelter women. Thus was the Taliban movement born; the men’s lost honor was restored, and women were “protected” by being placed under something close to house arrest.[9]

Women’s captivity is now such an essential part of the dominant discourse on Islam that it shows up in unlikely places. Consider Phyllis Chesler’s most recent book, The Death of Feminism (2005). More than four decades (and 12 books) after her trip to Afghanistan, the prolific author of the pioneering Women and Madness (1973) remembers that she was imprisoned there in the early 1960s. Chesler, who had presented Afghanistan in her earlier works as an exciting place, populated by kind and good-humored people, likens it now to Iran, “a country that has been described as a ‘giant prison for women.’” She refers to her departure as an “escape.”[10] The fourth chapter of the book begins with an arresting revelation: “On December 21, 1961, when I returned from my captivity in Afghanistan, I literally kissed the ground at Idlewild Airport.”

The language and the plot of this chapter, titled “My Afghan Captivity,” mark a distinctive shift in scenario, tone, style and point of view from earlier versions of the same trip. Although in the introduction to The Death of Feminism, Chesler states that she is writing about her “Afghan sojourn here at length for the first time,” she had previously published at least two other full-length accounts of her experience as a young bride in a foreign land, first in a 1969 Mademoiselle magazine article titled “Memoirs of Afghanistan” and later, “My First Husband: Men in Iranistan,” in her book, About Men (1978), a psycho-historical exploration of patriarchy. She also alluded to her visit in her 1986 book, Mothers on Trial, and her 2003 work, The New Anti-Semitism.[11]

The “captivity” in Afghanistan is not only a delayed afterthought, a newsworthy postscript; it is, in Chesler’s own words, “a cautionary tale.” The author is quick to alert her readers to the serious dangers that Islam and the “primitive East” pose. “What happened to me in Afghanistan must also be taken as a cautionary tale of what can happen when one romanticizes the ‘primitive’ East,” she writes. “I had seen just how badly women are treated in the Islamic world. As a young bride, I had been mistreated, too—but I survived and got out. I hope that telling my story will help other Westerners understand and empathize with Muslim and Arab women (and men) who are being increasingly held hostage to barbarous and reactionary customs.” And since Muslim women “are unlikely to oppose tyranny unless they are specially and persistently ‘deprogrammed,’” they need to be “militarily and legally protected from domestic terrorism.”

Although it is hard to miss the direct correlation established here between women’s captivity and the need for foreign intervention, military or otherwise, to set them free, I do not presume to know the intentions or the political agendas of Chesler or any of the other authors I discuss in this essay. Nor do I wish to challenge the accounts of their incarceration, literal or figurative, exact or approximate, prolonged or short, recent or long ago. My objective here is to concentrate on the widespread appeal of prison literature, particularly as it is exemplified by the figure of the Muslim Woman. What is it about women’s captivity in the Islamic world that catches immediate attention these days? How does it relate to social dramas unfolding within American society? What impact do these images of incarceration have on popular understandings of Islam in general and Muslim women in particular? Even if these life narratives were published as novels, as works of fiction, we would still need to ponder why the experience of captivity is so imperative, so key to the books’ unfolding plots, so indispensable to their popularity.

Oft-Told Stories Never Told

Tales of captivity have, alas, become incorporated into our collective consciousness and literary imagination. Their large-scale publication is a byproduct of modernity and associated with the appearance of the prison as a form of punishment central to modern penal systems.[12] In book after book, in one anguished account after another, men and women from Eastern Europe to China and Africa, from the Middle East to Asia and America, have lamented a long list of atrocities and indignities suffered in captivity. They have described dark dungeons; brutal interrogations; forced confessions; public recantations; mental torments; muzzled voices; blindfolded eyes; maimed bodies. They have depicted massacres in secret jails and the brutalities of solitary confinement in terms as vivid as the recorded experiences of Russians detained in the Soviet gulag and Jews locked up in Nazi concentration camps.

There are also an increasing number of prison memoirs by Muslim men and women, even though the latter are, by and large, new to the enterprise (starting with Zaynab al-Ghazali in Egypt and Ashraf Dehghani in Iran). In recent years, however, more and more women, often religious, political and human rights activists, have written in candid detail about the pains and privations of living behind bars. Yearning for freedom and justice, they portray themselves as imbued with a spirit of survival, resistance, even hope. Far from being willing convicts, passive victims in need of special and persistent deprogramming from abroad, they succeed in tearing down walls, pushing against the boundaries that contain them, making frontiers vanish, bearing witness to the hitherto unspoken, sprouting wings, flying through their texts.

On the surface, women’s prison memoirs and hostage narratives share certain commonalities. Born out of a desire to refuse erasure, both categories cathartically recount traumatic experiences and share personal tales of survival and liberation. Both genres present gripping tales, a form of protest against imposed stillness and invisibility. Underneath the seeming similarities, however, the two genres are as different as pomegranates and dates. While one is an eloquent testimony to women’s agency, courage and defiance, the other trivializes or contradicts, in impact if not in intent, women’s attempts at subversion, their forms of resistance and self-assertion. Whereas the former has its roots in women’s increased, albeit contentious access to the public arena, to the world of politics and publishing and public discourse, the latter neglects their important and unprecedented presence in the public sphere. It focuses on prisons, but ignores prisoners and their memoirs.

Marina Nemat, author of the best-selling Prisoner of Tehran, who was forcibly married to a prison guard (and had to convert to Islam to do so), explains why she decided to write down her horrible memories after keeping silent for a quarter-century. “This is my way of paying back, because it is the story of political prisoners of Iran,” she told Tavis Smiley of PBS in an interview aired in May 2007. “But this is a story that has never been told. Thousands of innocent people were killed in those prisons and nobody knows.” Memoirs by female Iranian political prisoners, before and especially after the Islamic Revolution, are, in fact, numerous.[13]

Flashbacks of Trauma

Unlike prison memoirs, which are born out of an experience of incarceration, the genealogy of hostage narratives can be traced to a political event: the hostage crisis. It was on November 4, 1979, soon after the Islamic Revolution, when a group of militant students stormed the US Embassy in Tehran, and took 52 Americans hostage. To their delighted surprise, the hostage takers found themselves the object of infinite attention. Their images, alongside those of blindfolded Americans, were on the front pages of major and minor newspapers, on the covers of leading magazines, on television screens, on T-shirts and banners and trees and walls and bridges. An indelible sense of anguish etched itself into the collective memory of a justifiably outraged nation. “America in Captivity” was the headline that summed up the mood of a country in psychic pain. Like harrowing flashbacks of a trauma, hostage taking became a recurrent theme in books and films and news clips about Iran and, by extension, the Islamic world.

A particularly transparent illustration of the hostage narrative can be found in Betty Mahmoody’s 1987 memoir, Not Without My Daughter.[14] The plot is simple: The Mahmoodys’ idyllic life begins in America, where Betty meets Bozorg Mahmoody, an Iranian-born, American-educated physician. The couple marry and, for almost eight years, live a life of luxury. But this dream life quickly ends when husband and wife, accompanied by their daughter, Mahtob, 4, travel to Iran in August 1984. The two-week vacation turns into an endless nightmare. The doting husband and devoted father metamorphoses into a selfish monster who locks up his wife and daughter against their wishes. Thus begins the perilous 18-month quest of mother and daughter to set themselves free. Bozorg Mahmoody, who responded to the accusations brought against him in a 2003 Finnish documentary titled “Without My Daughter,” disputes Betty’s account of these events.

Readers of Not Without My Daughter, this “true story of a desperate struggle to survive and to escape from an alien and frightening culture,” are invited to participate emotionally in the drama. “Imagine yourself alone and vulnerable,” urges the marketing blurb. “Imagine yourself…trapped by a husband you thought you trusted, and held prisoner in his native Iran, a land where women have no rights and Americans are despised.” The word “hostage,” as well as its various synonyms, appears frequently throughout the book. “Were Mahtob and I prisoners? Hostages? Captives of the venomous stranger who had once been a loving husband and father?” asks Betty Mahmoody initially. But soon she comes to recognize that she is not the only inmate in this prison-nation. All Iranian women are prisoners like her. “Now I realized anew that these women were caught in a trap just as surely as I, subject to the rules of a man’s world, disgruntled but obedient.”

Iran is not only a giant gulag, but also an evil nation. “For 18 months,” Mahmoody writes, “I had been trapped in a country that, to me, had seemed populated almost totally with villains.” And villains, as Isabel Allende reminds us in Paula, “are the most delicious part of a story.”[15] One needs their presence to justify escaping from them, telling juicy tales about them, bombing them. This evil country, this nation of captives and captors, is simply beyond redemption. Even its own citizens think extinction would be its just desserts. Quoting her furious and despairing spouse, Mahmoody writes: “The only thing that could ever straighten out this screwed-up country is an atomic bomb! Wipe it off the map and start over.”[16] Twenty years before Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) would sing, “Bomb, bomb, bomb, bomb, bomb Iran,” to the old Beach Boys tune “Barbara Ann,” the idea was proposed in the most popular book ever published in the US about Iran.

Not Without My Daughter sold some 12 million copies and was translated into more than 20 languages. Selected as a Literary Guild alternate, it was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize in 1987. Sally Fields acted in the movie adaptation. And the book turned its narrator into a national, and even international, celebrity. Mahmoody was celebrated by Oakland University in Michigan as Outstanding Woman of the Year and in Germany as Woman of the Year. Her alma mater, Alma College, also in Michigan, gave her an honorary doctorate.

“The Dank, Dark Cell”

We need not entertain any illusions about the Islamic Republic of Iran. Repression, autocracy, political and religious purges, censorship, and gender inequity are facts of contemporary life. They should be written about, both inside and outside the country, as indeed they have been. But Iran is not a literary dystopia. It is a real country with real people. It is also a land of paradoxes, a society in transition. Conditions shift and alter radically from one day to the next. Nothing is exactly as it seems or what it was just a while ago. And surely no one can accuse the Islamic Republic of intolerance toward its own contradictions, particularly when it comes to the treatment of women. Indeed, two competing narratives of womanhood exist side by side in Iran today. Iranian women can vote and run for some of the highest offices in the country, but must observe an obligatory dress code. They can drive personal vehicles, even taxis and trucks and fire engines, but cannot ride bicycles. They are seated away from men in the back of buses, but can be squashed in between perfect male strangers in overcrowded jitney taxis. They have entered the world stage as Nobel Peace Laureates, human rights activists, best-selling authors, prize-winning film directors and Oscar nominees, but cannot enter government offices through the same door as men. It is this complex mixture of protest and accommodation, of resistance and acquiescence, that reflects most accurately a woman’s life in Iran today.

Yet only one side of this ongoing battle, that which reflects a static image of victimhood, dominates America’s imagination and most of its bestsellers. Take Azar Nafisi’s highly acclaimed memoir Reading Lolita in Tehran, canonized by First Lady Laura Bush, alongside such world classics as The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, The Brothers Karamazov, Jane Eyre, War and Peace and The Little Prince, in her list of “25 books to read before you’re 25.”[17] This is the story of seven “girls” and their teacher, caught in “someone else’s dream.” Like Chesler and Mahmoody, Nafisi depicts Iran as an open-air detention facility and equates all Iranian women with Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita, “the little entrapped mistress” of Humbert Humbert, “her rapist and jailer.” They are resigned prisoners of a “stern ayatollah, a self-proclaimed philosopher-king,” who has confiscated not only their rights, but also their identities. Here in this vast prison, women are defined by their imprisonment, just as “Lolita’s image is forever associated in the minds of her readers with that of her jailer,” having “no meaning” on its own and only coming “to life through her prison bars.”

Captivity is the central metaphor of Nafisi’s memoir. It appears in a wide variety of contexts. In a passage reminiscent of Mahmoody’s sense of entrapment in Iran, the author/narrator writes, “I had started having nightmares and sometimes woke up screaming, mainly because I felt I would never again be able to leave the country.” Even when she does leave and travel abroad (and she does so repeatedly), she still feels suffocated. She confides in her students “about waking up at night feeling as if I were choking, as if I would never be able to get out, about the dizzy spells and nausea and pacing around the apartment at all hours of the night.”

Captivity, coping with and escaping from it, is also the primary theme of the Western literature class that is the main subject of Reading Lolita in Tehran. “I formulated certain general questions for them to consider, the most central of which was how these great works of imagination could help us in our present trapped situation as women.” To further clarify the mission of the class, Nafisi notes, “We were not looking for blueprints, for an easy solution, but we did hope to find a link between the open spaces the novels provided and the closed ones we were confined to.” Her hope finds fulfillment. Here is how one of the students describes her emotions as she enters the classroom: “Mitra began to tell us how she felt as she climbed up the stairs every Thursday morning. She said that step by step she could feel herself gradually leaving reality behind her, leaving the dark, dank cell she lived in to surface for a few hours into open air and sunshine. Then, when it was over, she returned to her cell.”[18] If Iran is the prison, “the dark, dank cell,” then the road to lasting freedom is through departure and flight.[19] Another student captures this message in a nutshell: “You set up a model for us that staying here is useless, that we should all leave if we want to make something of ourselves.”

Americanization

In a review essay on books about Iran, Patrick Clawson writes, “And what becomes established in the Western mind as the realities about Iran may not bear any resemblance to what careful scholarship demonstrates. Therefore, a good rule of thumb for learning about Iran is to read the obscure scholarly books and ignore anything that sells well.”[20] Academic circles, like Clawson, view bestsellers with some disdain. As Leslie Schunk writes: “It is symptomatic of our times that many of us serious readers are not encouraged but, to the contrary, are put off by learning a book has won a Pulitzer Prize…and/or is a popular book club selection and/or has been on the New York Times list of bestsellers for 110 weeks.”[21] But, of course, popular books wield great power by touching the hearts and souls of Americans, especially at a time when the stories they believe in can become guidelines for the country’s foreign policy. The authors of hostage narratives speak to massive audiences, not only through their books, but also via radio and television interviews, articles and opinion pieces published in major newspapers and influential magazines, widely advertised, well-attended lectures and the publicity attending prestigious awards.

It is ironic that these depictions of Muslim women as prisoners for life should be so popular in the United States, when one considers that the “Land of the Free” imprisons three times more women than any other nation. Thanks to the staggering boom of incarceration during the last two decades, in fact, the US is now the world’s number one jailer, with over 2.2 million people behind bars. As a 2006 report from the National Council on Crime and Delinquency put it, “The US has less than 5 percent of the world’s population, but over 23 percent of the world’s incarcerated people.”[22] Given these figures, which have attracted little attention, to be sure, one wonders if the interest in Muslim women’s supposed lifetime imprisonment is a denial or a projection of a harsh American reality. Does the hostage narrative titillate and comfort? Does it make the massive US penal system seem normal and necessary?

Perhaps, but there are undoubtedly several other factors at play in the popular appeal of hostage narratives. They spin engaging and suspenseful yarns, replete with love, betrayal and intrigue, and the extra spice of raids, bombings and executions. They alleviate the anxieties of their time by reflecting them; reaffirm the values of society by meditating on their loss; validate subtle and not so subtle stereotypes and misperceptions. Most importantly, they reel in the unsuspecting reader with a number of rhetorical devices and literary strategies that, in effect, Americanize the stories.

Indeed, the hostage narrative is highly reminiscent of an indigenous literary genre, the captivity narrative, which was popular from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. The plot in such books was often a simple series of reversals. The protagonist, usually a woman, was nabbed by Native Americans, who took her from her life of comfort and freedom into harsh confinement and rough living. Whether she walked unwittingly into the trap or was abducted by force, the innocent prisoner always endured extraordinary torments. She faced adversity with unusual courage and resolve. In the end, the forces of good won out, and the victim returned home to tell her tale of survival, which was all the more riveting for being true.

Today, autobiographies, memoirs and travelogues are some of the most popular kinds of books published in the United States. Self-narration, it seems, is an acknowledged right, a favorite American pastime. Even those who do not want to write a book about their lives make personal statements on bumper stickers and license plates; they tattoo them on their bodies; they reveal their lives on talk shows or webcams linked to Internet sites such as YouTube and Facebook; they participate in and eagerly watch reality TV; they bare their souls for mass consumption.

Public confessions of misfortune and hard-earned redemption, even coming from characters with ambiguous moral or legal status, seem to fascinate Americans. The more unbearable the suffering, the better the sales; the more sordid or horrific the experience, the greater the potential for commercial success. Consider James Frey’s calculated announcement in the first line of A Million Little Pieces: “I am an Alcoholic and I am a drug Addict and I am a Criminal.” Frey could not publish his story as a novel. Seventeen different publishers rejected his manuscript. Astonishingly, however, when he labeled it a “memoir,” abracadabra, it was picked up by a premier publishing house, Doubleday. As “non-fiction,” it sold millions of copies and was praised for its openness and candor. Three years later, and only after the veracity of some sections was questioned, Frey admitted to having embellished some of his personal experiences and to having fabricated others. Only 18 out of 432 pages of the book are in dispute, he told Larry King. “This is an appropriate ratio for a memoir,” he thought. Kathryn Harrison has a point when she writes, “We love stories of overcoming hardship; really, the only way to improve on them is to multiply the hero’s woes.”[23]

The real appeal of hostage narratives, however, is the hunger of the American reading public for detailed and accessible information about the Islamic world, in particular that which claims to transcend partisan politics and go beyond the headlines. So, what is there to read?

Although the number of books published in the US has increased steadily, the $25 billion publishing industry is dominated by a few conglomerates driven by an obsession with blockbusters. The not so lucrative business of translation from other languages into English, a cornerstone of intercultural communication and better understanding among nations, has no real place in such a market.[24] The number of translations, regardless of genre, has dropped steeply in the last two decades. According to a study conducted by the National Endowment for the Arts, of the 12,828 books of fiction and poetry published in the United States in 1999, only 297 (2.3 percent) were literary translations. Of these, 72 percent were from Western and Eastern Europe. Only 18 translated titles were of Middle Eastern origin.[25] In 2004, after the September 11 attacks had stimulated Americans’ interest in the perspectives of others, a scant 2.62 percent of all books published were translated from other languages. By comparison, 29 percent of all books published in the Czech Republic and 25 percent in Spain were works of translation.[26] And in Iran, of a total of 38,546 books published in the country in 2004, 8,976 or 23 percent were translated books, a ratio consistent with the previous years.[27] The conversation between the reading public in the United States and the rest of the world has become more like a monologue.

This is why Maryam, the Iranian-American protagonist of Anne Tyler’s novel, Digging to America, regrets that “Americans read only American literature.”[28] On the face of it, her statement seems implausible, especially given all the mixing and interdependence entailed in globalization. Strictly speaking, it is not even true. For starters, Maryam’s compatriot, Jalal al-Din Rumi, has been a best-selling poet in America for the past two decades, as attractive or meaningful to Americans as Walt Whitman or Shakespeare in terms of the number of books sold.[29] Some 700 years after his death, the Muslim mystic continues to mesmerize American readers with his message of love and religious tolerance. Elsewhere, in the US academy, an avalanche of books and articles about Muslim societies are produced in several disciplines and from a variety of perspectives. Yet—and this is where Maryam has a point—poets, academics and the small number of translated books reach a limited readership, while popular books wind up in the hands of millions.

Necessary Distinctions

Scholarship, indeed, has become something of a liability. When Hirsi Ali tells her mentor, the prominent Dutch politician Neelie Kroes, that she plans to move to the United States to pursue a doctorate, she is swiftly dissuaded from doing so. Why? “Neelie said my dreams of academia were like a sinkhole; they would never go anywhere. No matter how wonderful a Ph.D. thesis I wrote, it would disappear into a file drawer. It would never shift the lives of Muslim women by an inch.”[30] Clearly, Kroes, the politician, knew the marketplace well. In less than two years, Hirsi Ali turned her anecdotal tale into what passed for two authoritative studies of Islam and Muslim women and two international sensations. Angrily, she also decried “infuriatingly stupid analysts—especially those who called themselves Arabists, yet seemed to know next to nothing about the reality of the Islamic world.”[31]

In his 2005 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, Harold Pinter said: “In 1958 I wrote the following: ‘There are no hard distinctions between what is real and what is unreal, nor between what is true and what is false. A thing is not necessarily either true or false; it can be both true and false.’ I believe that these assertions still make sense and do still apply to the exploration of reality through art.” As a writer, Pinter said, he stands by his earlier judgment. “But as a citizen,” he cannot. “As a citizen, I must ask: What is true? What is false?” We live in times that, to use Pinter’s terms, call upon ordinary citizens to pay unusual attention to the truth and falsehood of what they are told. But these are times, as in Pinter’s case, that call upon the artist as citizen, or the citizen in the artist, to carry an even heavier burden in determining what is true and what is false.

As citizens of an increasingly polarized world, we, the readers, cannot afford to suspend critical judgment and accept as fact deliberate manipulation of lives and histories. We need to question the distortions of truth, the betrayals of history, the berating of scholarship, the politics of publishing and image making. We need to examine the seductiveness and political function of Muslim women’s tales of captivity, sustained and supported by official power, recognized by the media, authenticated by hostage narratives. Should we diversify our pool of information and pay closer attention to a competing narrative of the Muslim Woman, one which is not trapped in tales of her unending captivity, one which will only gain vigor and currency when more facts about her world become known, then far from being the “captive” she is portrayed to be, she would be recognized as a moderating, modernizing force, a seasoned negotiator of confined spaces, a veteran trespasser of boundaries, walls, fences, cages, blind windows, closed doors and iron gates.

Author’s Note: This essay is an excerpt from a chapter of my forthcoming book, Remapping the Cultural Geography of Iran: Islam, Women and Freedom of Movement. During the last four years, I have presented the concept of hostage narratives in several talks, symposia and roundtables (at New York University, Simon Fraser University, Washington and Lee University, the University of Chicago, Bennington College, Stanford University, the University of Texas-Austin and Oxford University, among other places) and benefited enormously from the questions, suggestions and challenges of colleagues and participants.

Endnotes


[1] Women’s clothing, regardless of country or faith, has often constrained mobility. Remarkably, it has been easier to see and criticize the oppressive and immobilizing fashion of others than of the self. Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, who traveled to Turkey in 1716, recounts how harem women viewed her attire as a true prison. Invited to a Turkish bath, Lady Mary’s undressing attracts animated surprise. “‘Come hither and see how cruelly the poor English ladies are used by their husbands,’ screams the lady of the house. ‘You need boast indeed of the superior liberties allowed you, when they lock you thus up in a box.’” Lord E. Wharnecliffe, ed., The Letters and Works of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, vol. 1 (London: 1887), p. 247.

[2] “Captivity” is also a trendy component of book titles. See, in addition to the books treated in this essay, Azar Arianpour, Tall Walls: From Palace to Prison (1998); Danya Curry, Heather Mercer and Stacy Mattingly, Prisoners of Hope: The Story of Our Captivity and Freedom in Afghanistan (2002); Mary Quin, Kidnapped in Yemen: One Woman’s Amazing Escape from Captivity (2005)—only some of the titles published in the US in the past decade. Some of these books are about Western women held captive in the Muslim world and as such they fall in a different category. My intention here is to focus on the allure of captivity as a catchword in titles.

[3] Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Infidel (New York: Free Press, 2007), pp. 285, 350. Infidel was published in Holland under the title My Freedom.

[4] See Mohja Kahf, Western Representations of Muslim Women: From Termagant to Odalisque (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1999).

[5] The Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi writes: “The French and German publishers of my books always insist on having the word ‘harem’ on the cover and a photo of a veiled woman. When I protest, they tell me that this makes it sell better, even if the contents of the book contradict this image. It is time to unveil women on the covers of books that sell in the West.” Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1992), p. 187, fn 10.

[6] An Associated Press poll released in August 2007 reported that, among “avid readers,” the typical woman reads nine books a year, while the typical man reads five. The gender gap was far wider in the fiction market. National Public Radio, September 5, 2007. www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14175229.

[7] They are: Sally Armstrong, Veiled Threat: The Hidden Power of the Women of Afghanistan; Cheryl Benard, Veiled Courage: Inside the Afghan Women’s Resistance; Chékéba Hachemi Latifa, My Forbidden Face, Growing Up Under the Taliban: A Young Woman’s Story; Harriet Logan, Un/Veiled: Voices of Women in Afghanistan; Batya Swift Yasgur, Behind the Burqa: Our Life in Afghanistan and How We Escaped to Freedom; Dayna Curry, Heather Mercer and Stacy Mattingly, Prisoners of Hope: The Story of Our Captivity and Freedom in Afghanistan; and Zoya (with John Follain and Rita Cristofari), Zoya’s Story: An Afghan Woman’s Struggle for Freedom.

[8] For notable exceptions, see, for instance, Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban (New York: Penguin Press, 2006) and Ann Jones, Kabul in Winter: Life Without Peace in Afghanistan (Metropolitan, 2006).

[9] See Robert Fisk, “War on Terrorism: Rise and Fall of Village Cleric Who Fought ‘Criminals and Traitors,’” Znet, December 7, 2001.

[10] Phyllis Chesler, The Death of Feminism (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2005), p. 20. Later, on p. 81, Chesler writes that Afghanistan is “a prison, a police state, a feudal monarchy, a theocracy, rank with fear and paranoia.”

[11] Phyllis Chesler, The New Anti-Semitism (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003), pp. 14–17; and Mothers on Trial (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), pp. 339–342.

[12] Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).

[13] For a list of Iranian prison memoirs, see www.utoronto.ca/prisonmemoirs/farsibooks.htm.

[14] Betty Mahmoody with William Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991).

[15] Isabel Allende, Paula (trans. Margaret Sayers Peden) (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 17.

[16] Judge Patrick Reed Joslyn, who presided over the divorce and custody hearings of the Mahmoodys, also had a prescription of death and destruction. In the Finnish documentary chronicling the husband’s version of the story, the judge announces that, “If I were in charge of the country, there’d be a lot of dead Iranians.”

[17] Ironically enough, Nabokov’s masterpiece, Lolita, the very book that lent Nafisi her title, does not appear on this illustrious list.

[18] Many other woman narrators express this feeling of imprisonment. In My Forbidden Face, Latifa writes: “I can’t think of anything to do. Sometimes I wander around my home like a convict taking a tour of her cell.”

[19] In PEN’s inaugural Arthur Miller Freedom to Write Memorial Lecture, Orhan Pamuk said, “As for those who emigrate from these poor countries to the West or the North to escape economic hardship and brutal repression—as we know, they sometimes find themselves further brutalized by the racism they encounter in rich countries. Yes, we must also be alert to those who denigrate immigrants and minorities for their religion, their ethnic roots or the oppression that the governments of the countries they’ve left behind have visited on their own people.” “Freedom to Write,” New York Review of Books, May 25, 2006.

[20] Patrick Clawson, “Iran in Books: Review Essay,” Middle East Quarterly 14/2 (Spring 2007).

[21] Leslie Schunk, “Memoirs: From Scribbling into High Art,” World Literature Today 73/3 (Summer 1999), p. 475.

[22] The report goes on, “Some individual US states imprison up to six times as many people as do nations of comparable population.” Christopher Hartney, US Rates of Incarceration: A Global Perspective (National Council on Crime and Delinquency, November 2006).

[23] Kathryn Harrison, “Lives in the Arts,” New York Times Book Review, February 18, 2007.

[24] In her enlightening book, The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain (New York: Back Bay Books, 2002), Maria Rosa Menocal equates a “culture of translation” with a “culture of tolerance.”

[25] Aviya Kushner, “Literary Translations in America,” Poets and Writers (November/December 2002). Lorraine Adams, referring to the lack of interest in Arab literature in the US, writes: “Non-fiction devoted to the Arab world may be in demand, but interest in Arab literature, even after Naguib Mahfouz’s Nobel Prize in 1988, hasn’t moved too far past Aladdin and Sinbad.” “Palestinian Lives,” New York Times Book Review, January 15, 2006.

[26] Jascha Hoffman, “Data: Comparative Literature,” New York Times Book Review, April 15, 2007.

[27] In 1998, 27 percent of a total of 15,960 books published in Iran were translated books. In 1999, the ratio was 24 percent of 20,642; in 2000, 18 percent of 23,305; in 2001, 18 percent of 30,885; in 2002, 23 percent of 32,801; and in 2003, 23 percent of 34,462. See the relevant volumes of Karnameh-e nashr: fehrest-e mozoee ketabhay montasher shodeh [Publishing Index: A Thematic List of Published Books] (Tehran: Khaneh Ketab).

[28] Anne Tyler, Digging to America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), p. 170.

[29] Some of the most popular American translators of Rumi cannot read him in the original Persian. They use earlier translations of Rumi for what can perhaps be called translations of translations.

[30] Hirsi Ali, Infidel, p. 295.

[31] Ibid., p. 270.

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